The Root of the Opium War: Mismanagement in the Aftermath of the British East India Company\u27s Loss of its Monopoly in 1834 by Karsh, Jason A
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Honors Program in History (Senior Honors Theses) Department of History
5-2-2008
The Root of the Opium War: Mismanagement in
the Aftermath of the British East India Company's
Loss of its Monopoly in 1834
Jason A. Karsh
University of Pennsylvania, jkarsh@sas.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/hist_honors
Part of the History Commons
A Senior Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Honors in History.
Faculty Advisors: Siyen Fei and Lynn Hollen Lees
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/hist_honors/13
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Karsh, Jason A., "The Root of the Opium War: Mismanagement in the Aftermath of the British East India Company's Loss of its
Monopoly in 1834" (2008). Honors Program in History (Senior Honors Theses). 13.
http://repository.upenn.edu/hist_honors/13
The Root of the Opium War: Mismanagement in the Aftermath of the
British East India Company's Loss of its Monopoly in 1834
Abstract
The histories of the Opium War, of which there are many, have posited that the roots of the conflict are diverse
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subsequently denied formal diplomatic relations with the Chinese. However, in investigating documents of
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actions set Sino-British relations on a path to war. It was the loss of the British East India Company’s
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Introduction 
 
 The histories of the Opium War, of which there are many, have posited that the roots of 
the conflict are diverse and interconnected, ranging from cultural differences to conflicting 
perspectives on trade.  Many historians imply that the Opium War was somehow inevitable.  
They point to the famous Macartney Mission of 1793, in which the first British diplomat to meet 
the Chinese emperor refused to kowtow1 and was subsequently denied formal diplomatic 
relations with the Chinese.  However, in investigating documents of the British East India 
Company at Canton some years later, the war in no way seemed predestined.  On the contrary, 
there existed a collaborative and mutually beneficial relationship between the Chinese and 
British merchants at Canton.   
Undoubtedly, cultural differences played a role in the conflict.  Nevertheless, there was a 
more concrete root of the Opium War.  The loss of the British East India Company’s monopoly 
on the China trade in late 1833 amplified the tensions and problems that had been cautiously 
managed by the East India Company for the half-century of the Canton System.  Upon learning 
of the loss of monopoly in December 1833, a Company correspondent in London prophetically 
remarked: 
Though I think the abolition of the China monopoly was inevitable and that it never 
would have done for us to have gone on trading in competition with the public as a 
system, I fear, and believe, the sudden and entire stop put to our commercial relations 
with China, will tend materially to injure our assets, to enhance our responsibilities and to 
produce mischief which might have been avoided by a more gradual change.2 
 
 Through examining the archives of the East India Company Factory at Canton from 
March 1833 until July 1834 it becomes quite clear that the internal problems of regulating trade 
at Canton, the relationship with the Hong Merchants, the attitudes toward the Chinese, and the 
                                                 
1 Ritual prostrations before the emperor. 
2 Bowen, H.V. The Business of Empire. 
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legal and political issues that arose all paint a lucid, new narrative of the root of the Opium War.  
The documents demonstrate that the Company’s successful management of the tenuous 
relationship with the Chinese merchants at Canton actually helped avoid conflict and legal 
infractions with higher authorities.  Although the Company lacked true authority over the British 
subjects at Canton—other than providing them with licenses—it carried out the difficult task of 
representing the entire British community to the Chinese.  Thus, when significant problems 
arose, the company’s long-standing relationship with the Chinese merchants ultimately led to 
decades of a stable, lucrative trade for the British.   
 However, when the Company lost its monopoly over the China trade in April of 1834, the 
management of the relationship drastically changed.  The first British superintendent of trade, 
Lord Napier, would exhibit stubbornness, belligerence and a misunderstanding of the Chinese.  
Refusing to draw upon the knowledge of colleagues who were experienced in the China trade, 
his cavalier actions set Sino-British relations on a path to war.  It was the loss of the British East 
India Company’s monopoly and the subsequent restructuring of the trade relationship on the 
ground at Canton that would ultimately set the stage for the precipitation of armed conflict in the 
Opium War of 1840. 
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Chapter 1-Background 
British Trade with China 
 
Over the course of the 17th century, the fall of the Ming dynasty and the rise of the Qing 
dynasty threatened the stability of Chinese politics and trade.  However, by 1662, the Qing had 
successfully eliminated all claimants to the Ming throne and began to consolidate their political 
authority over the Middle Kingdom. 3  It was during this tumultuous period in modern Chinese 
history that the first English ships were chartered by the British East India Company to trade 
with India and the Far East. Queen Elizabeth, in 1600, granted the Company a monopoly over 
the India and Far East trade that would last for centuries.   
 During the early Qing dynasty, policies towards foreign trade fluctuated significantly and 
were not universally applied to all countries and traders.  Whereas the Dutch and Portuguese 
sought true diplomatic relations, the British traders in the early Qing relied on informal trade.  
Ironically, it was the informality that behooved their trade potential.  More specifically, the 
Dutch and the Portuguese were given ‘tributary’ status by the Ministry of Rituals.  This meant 
that, along with the other non-Chinese peoples interacting with China, they were expected to 
formally acknowledge China’s political and cultural superiority.  They express their subservience 
to the Chinese emperor not only through the language of diplomatic documents, but also through 
their actions.  For instance, when in the presence of the emperor they had to make ritual 
prostrations known as kowtow.  In return, countries with ‘tributary’ status would be allowed to 
engage in a controlled amount of trade with China through ‘tribute missions,’ which would 
follow a fixed schedule of traveling to Beijing.  There they would exchange gifts with the 
emperor and then be permitted to trade.  The British merchants, on the other hand, did not seek 
                                                 
3 中国, zhongguo—the Chinese word for China is literally translated as Middle Kingdom. 
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out formal relations with the Qing.  Thus, they were permitted to trade freely at Zhoushan4, 
Xiamen5, and Canton6.  Eventually the trade was normalized when, in 1680, the Qing scaled 
back all coastal trade restrictions and opened trade to foreign merchants at select port-cities. 
 It was during the reign of the Yongzheng7 emperor that the policy towards foreign trade 
became increasingly restricted.  His edict banning the smoking and trade of opium in 1729 was 
indicative of opium becoming a problem for the Chinese government—a problem that went 
hand-in-hand with foreign trade.  Around the beginning of Yongzheng’s reign, the Chinese 
merchants at Canton took it upon themselves to both increase profitability and exert greater 
control over all commerce by forming a trade-guild called the Cohong.8  Then in 1754, the Qing 
government ordered the Hong merchants to take full responsibility for the behavior of the foreign 
merchants and the payment of fees to the Chinese government—thus establishing a monopoly of 
the Hong merchants at Canton.  The apparent ease of administration of the system at Canton, 
combined with escalating pressure from foreigners to open the doors of the China trade, only 
resulted in the augmentation of the regulation of the foreign trade.  When the British endeavored 
to establish trade at Xiamen and Ningbo9 in 1755 they were not only denied access but were 
completely restricted to Canton by 1757.10  Thus began the ‘Canton System’ of trade that would 
last until the Treaty of Nanjing11 in 1842.  
                                                 
4 舟山, formerly transliterated as Chusan. 
5 厦门, formerly transliterated as Amoy. 
6 广州, called Guangzhou, but since Canton is the far more common English version of the famous city, I will 
continue to refer to Guangzhou as Canton. 
7 雍正 (Yung-cheng)- Emperor of China from 1722-1735 
8 Cohong comes from how the British heard 公行, gonghang, meaning “combined merchant companies.”  They are 
also commonly referred to as the Hong merchants. 
9 宁波, formerly transliterated as Ningpo. 
10 Chang 3 
11 The Treaty of Nanjing marked the end of the Opium War and began the Treaty-Port system of trade in China. 
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The stipulations of the Canton System were outlined in the ‘Eight Regulations,’ which 
were issued in 1760 and reaffirmed consistently until the late 1830s.12  The Westerners were 
obligated to deal exclusively with the Hong merchants for all matters.  Initially there were 11 
Hong merchants, of which the most famous were Howqua and Mowqua13.  Thereafter, two 
additional Hong merchants entered the guild in 183214.  These Hong merchants not only 
regulated trade with the foreigners, they would also act as the intermediaries to the Qing 
government official known by the British as the Hoppo15.   As the only link to the Chinese 
officials, it would be up to the Hoppo to forward on any correspondence to local or Imperial 
officials, if he decided to forward a given document at all.  Additionally, the Imperial court used 
the Hong merchants to “keep an eye” on the foreign merchants to closely monitor their actions.16  
In an anomaly of diplomatic history, the Chinese government successfully skirted responsibility 
for foreign relations with Western nations by delegating all interaction to be with the Cohong.  
Indeed, until the late 1830s, all interaction with Chinese officials was implemented through this 
inherently indirect and sluggish line of communication.  
Further, there were stipulations within the ‘Eight Regulations’ that impacted the everyday 
actions of the foreign merchants living in the factories.  The westerners could not bring their 
wives to live with them, nor could they arm themselves with any sort of weapons.  There was a 
limit of 8 Chinese laborers who could work in a given factory, and foreigners were not permitted 
                                                 
12 Kuo 4 
13 Howqua’s actual name was 伍浩官, or Wu Haoguan; Mowqua’s actual name was 盧茂官, or Lu Maoguan. 
14 Kuo 6 
15 粤海關部, yuehai guanbu, the Chinese term for the Hoppo, meaning the Superintendent of Maritime Customs for 
广东, Guangdong Province. 
16 Fay, Peter Ward. The Opium War: 1840-1842. 
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to row their own boats for leisure17.  In short, the merchants lived in a restricted environment, 
isolated on the small settlement of factories along the Pearl River. 
The cumbersome process of the Canton System was a far cry from the trade system the 
Westerners were accustomed to in Europe.  The difficult trade procedure exacerbated the 
tensions that were already mounting due to the increasing demand for products like tea in the 
European markets, combined with the Chinese refusal to trade for anything other than silver 
bullion.  In 1793, the British believed it to be a fine time to try to change their fortune by opening 
a formal diplomatic channel with the Qing government in Beijing18.  Selected as an emissary of 
the British East India Company and King George III, Lord George Macartney traveled to the 
imperial court.  Claiming to have arrived to salute the Qianlong Emperor on his 80th birthday, 
they were given direct passage to land at the port closest to Beijing.  However, Macartney 
refused to kowtow to the emperor, compromising by merely kneeling on one knee and 
incorporating a series of bows. Surprisingly he was still received at the summer palace.  When 
finally in the presence of the Qianlong emperor, Macartney requested diplomatic residence in 
Beijing, the opening of new ports (and thus the end of the Canton system), and the fixing of a 
fair system of tariffs on the foreign trade.  In a decision that historian Jonathan Spence refers to 
as “unfailingly bland,” Qianlong and his minister refused to yield to any of Macartney’s 
requests.19  Further straining relations between the two nations, in a now famous letter to King 
George III, Qianlong condescendingly asserted: 
We have never valued ingenious articles nor do we have the slightest need of your 
country’s manufactures.  Therefore, O king, as regards your request to send someone to 
remain at the capital, while it is not in harmony with the regulations of the Celestial 
Empire we also feel very much that it is of no advantage to your country.20  
                                                 
17 Kuo 5 
18 北京, formerly transliterated as Peking. 
19 Spence, The Search for Modern China 122 
20 Spence 122-3 
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From the perspective of the British East India Company, being denied all requests to 
improve the trading relationship did little to improve their on-the-ground relationship with the 
Chinese.  That is without even making mention of the arrogant and insulting language used by 
the Chinese when referencing the west—the merchants were often referred to as ‘barbarians21.’ 
In examining the failures of the Macartney Mission, some historians believe that it planted the 
seed for conflict that somehow made war between the two nations inevitable.  Yet, the Canton 
system continued as it had for decades, through all its cumbersome processes and unfair trading 
practices—fluctuating tariffs, collusion by the Cohong, and refusal to trade for anything but 
silver. 
 
The British East India Company 
 Although the British East India Company received a monopoly charter from Queen 
Elizabeth in 1600, it was not until 1614 that it experienced any successful British trade with 
China.  However, the trade was not direct with China.  Rather, it was transacted through 
Bantam22 and Nagasaki23.24 Eventually, the Company attempted to set up trading relations 
through the Portuguese-controlled Macao25 in 1635.  Almost refusing the Company access to 
Macao, the only reason why the Portuguese allowed the British East India Company ship to berth 
was because it carried a cargo from the Viceroy at Portuguese-controlled Goa (in India).  No 
official relations were established and the British East India Company remained without a 
reliable port with which to trade with China. 
                                                 
21 夷, yi 
22 A port city on the western end of Java, Indonesia. 
23 A port city on the west coast of Kyushu, Japan. 
24 Wilbur 319 
25 澳门-AuMen, called Macao by Westerners. 
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 Two years later, in 1637, a ship traveled directly from London to Canton to establish 
more direct trading relations with the Chinese.  Once close to her destination, the ship was 
stopped by a Mandarin official who had heard unsavory rumors about the English via the 
Portuguese.  The Chinese threatened the ship, and it promptly returned from whence it came.26  
The tense relationship with the Portuguese was ameliorated by a formal agreement in 1654 to 
allow British ships to land at Portuguese ports.27  Still, the British East India Company was 
disadvantaged by its dislocation from a more established method of trade. 
 Seeking more creative ways to engage the Chinese in trade, the Company pursued trading 
opportunities in Cambodia, Taiwan28 and Tonkin in 1670.  Unfortunately, these “ineffectual 
commercial activities” did not yield the establishment of trade that the Company had hoped for.29  
In 1676, the Company finally established a factory at Xiamen, but the Company’s luck would 
again run dry.  The residual fighting between the Chinese and forces from Taiwan resulted in the 
burning of the Company’s factory in 1682—another impediment to their China trade.30 
 In 1682, the Company again attempted to set up a factory at Canton and were again 
denied trade and ordered to depart.  Fortunately, a new factory was established at Xiamen in 
1685 and provided the Company with an important trading base in the Far East.  It was in 1699, 
though, that the Company’s Board of Directors’ prayers were answered when the Hoppo finally 
agreed to allow the British to trade at Canton.31 
 Certainly, the opening of trade at Canton was a monumental development for the 
Company.  The trade at Canton served as the origin of the increasingly lucrative tea trade.  
                                                 
26 Wilbur 21 
27 Wilbur 322 
28 台湾- formerly known as Formosa 
29 Wilbur 323 
30 Wilbur 324 
31 Wilbur 325 
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Indeed, it exponentially enhanced the profitability and influence of the Company over the course 
of the 18th century. The East India Company imported tea for the first time in 1664, although not 
directly from China.32 The first direct shipment of tea from China to England was not until 1689, 
when it was imported from Xiamen.  Interestingly, while tea is called cha33 in most dialects of 
Chinese, Amoy pronunciation of the word was “t’e, [or] tay.”34  Hence, the West came to refer to 
the plant as tea. 
 Although the trade was manageable at the turn of the eighteenth century, the amount of 
trade administered through Canton would increase exponentially by the beginning of the 
Nineteenth Century.  Between 1711 an 1717, about 200,000 pounds of tea was imported to 
Britain per year by the Company.  By 1757, 3 million pounds per year were imported.35  By 1800 
the British imports of tea averaged an astonishing 24 million pounds annually.36 Hence, as 
demand for tea increased in Europe by the Nineteenth Century, the seemingly simplified trade 
with China at Canton would become increasingly more complex. 
 At the time of the booming tea trade, the company was also quite occupied with its 
extensive business in Mogul India.  They engaged in political games with local rulers to fortify 
their trade monopoly in India.  In doing so, in all but name, had “usurped imperial authority and 
sovereignty” over large regions of India like Bengal by 1757.37  The sheer power being amassed 
by this joint-stock company resulted in much debate in London.  The British Empire in India and 
the East, of crucial economic importance, was held under the control of a joint-stock company in 
London.  However, the intertwining of the Company and politics became so deep that the 
                                                 
32 Scott 17 
33 茶- Chinese character for tea 
34 Scott 17 
35 Lawson 97 
36 Scott 23 
37 Lawson 90 
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Company was considered “an alternate structure of politics to be exploited for public or 
parliamentary purposes by MPs38 and their respective followers.”39  At the close of the 
eighteenth century, the company essentially administered parts of India on behalf of the British 
government. It also was a bastion of the rich and powerful in Britain.  The wealth involved in the 
company made the company stocks the “most reliable long-term investment” that had also 
successfully “woven itself in the financial and social fabric” of Britain.40 
 However, even with all its power and influence, the tea trade threatened to bankrupt the 
Company. Much to the chagrin of Western traders, the only commodity the Europeans possessed 
that the Chinese demanded was silver.41 Thus, the Company had to rely on another trade that had 
a large consumer base in China so it could hope recover silver to finance the tea trade.  Indeed, it 
would be a substance that had frightful implications for China: Opium. 
 
The Opium Trade 
 Foreshadowing the future weakness and exploitation of the Chinese economy, the 
renowned economist, Adam Smith, wrote in 1776 that “a more extensive foreign trade…could 
scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of China, and to improve very much the 
productive powers of its manufacturing industry.”42  Still, the arrogant ignorance about the 
industrializing world would continue to color China’s perspective on foreign trade. 
Eventually, the trade balance favored China so much that the East India Company’s store 
of silver paled in comparison to the heaps of tea in London warehouses waiting to be sold on the 
                                                 
38 Members of Parliament 
39 Lawson 96 
40 Lawson 102 
41 Evans 109 
42 Gardella 1 
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demanding, English market.  The tea sales, however, would not make up for the shortage of 
silver and the Company was nearly bankrupt.43  However, the East India Company found that its 
cultivation of opium in India provided a product which had the potential to create an illicit, yet 
substantial, market in China.44  After all, opium already produced about one-seventh of the 
revenue from British India.45  In fact, a significant portion of the silver needed to administer the 
British Raj in India could be traced directly back to the sale of opium.  Concordantly, the opium 
market that was established in China provided an augmentation of financial support for the East 
India Company. 
It was in the trading season of 1773 that the Company first experimented in a small 
venture in the opium trade.  Proving to be a success, the trade grew and the Company even 
established its own trade depot near Macao.  However, desiring to maintain good formal trade 
relations with the Chinese, the Company was obliged to remove its direct involvement with the 
trade after an imperial opium prohibition edict in 1796.  The Chinese were clearly becoming 
increasingly angry about the illicit opium trade and—more importantly—its futile inability to 
stop or control the trade.  Yet, under pressure from the Chinese the Company casually declared 
that it was in no way part of the illicit trade and asserted that it was up to the local government, 
and not the Company to stifle the trade.  Ironically, though, the Company was simultaneously 
reassuring the opium producers and smugglers from India that the edicts from the Chinese 
government should cause no “undue alarm.”46  The Company also urged the smugglers, or 
‘country traders,’ to avoid calling the product “Company opium” so as to not alarm the officials 
at Canton.  Yet, the Company also included language in the licenses it issued for ships which 
                                                 
43 Evans 110 
44 Etherington 24 
45 Evans 110 
46 Chang 18 
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was directly contradictory to their public stance against the opium trade.  In fact, the licenses 
contained a clause stating that they would be void “if opium other than that procured at the 
company’s public sale in Bengal were taken aboard,” providing it with plausible deniability.47 
To provide some scope for the exponential growth of the opium trade, at the time of the 
first edict prohibiting the trade of opium in 1729 there were about 200 chests imported per year.  
By the late 1760s, approximately 1000 chests were imported per year.48  It was not until after the 
Company began to smuggle its opium into China around the turn of the 19th century, however, 
that the trade of the drug increased drastically.  During the first decade of the 19th century, the 
British were importing an average of 4,500 chests of opium to China per year.  Because of the 
efforts of the Chinese officials to weed out the trade at Canton, the opium trade mostly occurred 
at Macao.  The following decade witnessed trade return to Canton and the island Whampoa49, 
but the trade still hovered just short of 5,000 chests imported per year.50 
Between 1821 and 1830, the opium trade experienced another remarkable boom.  The 
trade centered around depots quality at the island Lintin51 and witnessed a per annum increase to 
18,760 chests per year. The Company’s opium trade accounted for approximately 10,114 chests 
per year during this decade.52 One of the main reasons for this increase was the introduction of 
Malwa opium into the trade, in addition to the traditional Patna opium.53  This increased the 
supply of opium, to the benefit of opium users, resulted in a reduction in the average price of the 
                                                 
47 Chang 18 
48 Chang 19 
49 黄埔, huangpu—because it is commonly referred to as Whampoa, even in recent history, I will continue to use 
the English iteration of the city. 
50 Chang 19 
51 零丁, lingding－ an island north of Hong Kong. 
52 Chang 21 
53 Patna opium was produced by the Company in Bengal, whereas Malwa was grown separately and challenged the 
Company’s monopoly over the production of opium in India.  Users also believed there was a difference in value, 
Patna being considered of a higher quality.  But Malwa was both cheaper and more abundant so it was beneficial to 
many opium users without great purchasing power. 
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drug.  Thus, more Chinese were able to afford opium, and the enlarged consumer base of addicts 
ensured the continuation of its trade.  In the final decade before the outbreak of the Opium War, 
the illicit trade gradually increased.  In the trade season of 1832-33, the British imported 15,403 
chests of opium into China, a substantial increase even from the previous year.54  Interestingly, 
the loss of the Company’s monopoly on the China trade, effective by April of 1834, while 
resulting in such an influx of a number of new traders, it did not affect opium imports as much as 
weaken Britain’s control over the trade.   
However, the true problem facing China now was not just the opium addicts in the south 
and in coastal cities.  The British began the trade with the intention of recovering the silver lost 
to the trade of tea, silk and porcelain.  Now, China faced a crippling outflow of silver—a drastic 
turn in their fortune considering they had for a long time profited from a net import of silver.  
According to British accounts, between 1828 and 1836 the British brought $4,307,000 worth of 
silver into China.  In that same time period, the British received $42,392,103 worth of silver for 
their trade.  That amounted to an astounding net export of $37,985,103 from China.55   
Thus, the intertwined financial problems and contempt for the opium trade certainly 
became the most noticeable undercurrents in the relations between China and Britain.  In 
examining the Chinese response to opium from the time of its emergence as a social 
phenomenon in the 18th century it appears that at the center of the issue was not the drug as much 
as the nature of the interaction between Europeans and the Chinese. 
 
China’s Reaction to the Opium Problem 
                                                 
54 Chang 22 
55 Chang 41 
 15 
From the Chinese perspective, the tragedy induced by the opium trade was one that was 
founded on a misunderstanding of western diplomacy and an inability to regulate foreign trade.  
The eighteenth century saw opium enter China not only through tributary means but also through 
individual traders. They would come from Southeast Asia and Taiwan during a century in which 
prevalent tobacco smoking made the practice of opium smoking socially acceptable—especially 
among the elite who had access to the drug.56  The first edict against opium was issued in 1729 
by the Yongzheng emperor, prohibiting its use and enumerating punishments that ranged from 
wearing a cangue57 to death by strangulation.58  A similar edict prohibiting the smoking of opium 
was also issued by Qianlong in 1780 [and then again by the Jiaqing59 emperor in 1810].60 In 
1796, an edict that “prohibited the domestic cultivation of poppy” was issued by the emperor, 
serving to provide further impetus for foreigners to import opium into China.61 Following the 
Imperial court’s example, in 1799 the governor-general of Canton also officially decreed the 
prohibition of the opium trade.62 The legal actions taken by the government during the eighteenth 
century surely suppressed some of the domestic cultivation of opium and punished a number of 
opium users and smugglers.  However, as explained above, it was only at the turn of the 
nineteenth century that the opium trade began to grow exponentially. 
 During the reign of Emperor Jiaqing, opium began to permeate the literati and the upper 
class of China with “its popularity and availability increasing” steadily.63  One of the first edicts 
relating to opium passed by Jiaqing’s court at the turn of the nineteenth century reiterated the 
                                                 
56 Zheng 6-7 
57 Similar to stocks used for punishment in the West, but cangues were not fixed to a base and were carried by user. 
58 Chang 219 
59 嘉慶 (Chia-ch’ing)- Emperor of China from 1796-1820, although he was emperor from 1796-1799 in name only 
as his father Qianlong still ruled China for three years after naming Jiaqing as his successor. 
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prohibition of growing poppy for the production of opium in China.64  Following the Imperial 
lead, the Hoppo, or Superintendent of Maritime Customs for Canton,65 also issued an edict 
banning the import of opium into China.66  In a display of either thoroughness or redundancy, in 
1807 the new Hoppo and the Emperor both issued edicts reiterating their previous prohibition of 
the import of opium, which was reiterated by the Governor-General of Canton in 1809.67  
Interestingly, these edicts did little to curb the opium trade as it was concurrently on the rise in 
Canton at the time of these edicts.68   
The Imperial court urged local officials, in 1811, to enforce opium punishments against 
those who sold opium.  However, in 1813, after discovering opium usage among his personal 
bodyguards, Jiaqing issued punishments specifically targeting officials who used opium.69  The 
opium problem had officially spread beyond the upper echelons of the elite and into the scholar-
officials and military in Chinese society. 
 It was during the Daoguang emperor’s reign that officials and literati became model 
consumers of opium, tangentially encouraging the spreading of the opium usage and culture to 
the lower classes of Chinese society.70 Shortly after the Daoguang emperor came to power, in 
November of 1821, he endorsed the Hoppo’s and the governor-general’s proposal to reduce the 
rank of prominent Chinese Hong merchant Howqua.  Specifically, he was implicated in the 
crime of “not preventing the import of opium.”71  Following up on March 8th, 1822, the 
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Daoguang emperor furtively instructed the governor-general of Canton to monitor the actions of 
the Hoppo to determine whether or not he had also “connived in the opium trade.”72   
Creating a scapegoat for the import of opium did little to actually reduce the amount of 
opium being trafficked into China.  Regardless, in an attempt to target corrupt officials who were 
implicated in the opium trade, the emperor issued another imperial edict on January 19, 1823.  It 
stipulated the emperor’s desire for the governor-general and the Hoppo to be “more vigorous in 
stopping the opium imports.”73 One can only guess the effectiveness of yet another broad 
command issued from the commanding heights of the dragon throne.  To increase the pressure 
on local officials, in 1823 the Daoguang emperor decreed that officials would be fined their 
salary if they “failed to confiscate or suppress imported or domestically produced opium” in the 
quantity of more than 100 catties74.  If over 1000 catties, they would find themselves demoted 
one grade.  If they accepted bribes or worked with smugglers they would be relieved of their 
office.75 As the actions of officials were often more public, these punishments were typically 
enforced. 
The aforementioned imperial edit of September 1823 provides a clear example of a 
policy that was aimed at not only punishing conniving officials, but also “negligent officials.”76  
For example, the punishments referred to situations in which an official failed to suppress opium 
trade or confiscate the contraband due to “ignorance,” with no clear definition of what would 
constitute ignorance.77  This provided for an easy method by which the Emperor could create 
scapegoats out of local officials in areas with opium problems.  Perhaps intentionally, it also 
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provided added pressure on officials to seek the eradication of the opium trade.  Finally 
beginning to synthesize the economic implications of the opium trade into his imperial edicts, the 
Daoguang emperor approved an 1829 regulation banning not only the import of opium, but also 
the export of silver.78 Although, noting the aforementioned net export of silver between 1828 and 
1836, the edict seemed to have no effect whatsoever. 
Seeking to keep in line with Imperial policy, many local edicts sought to prohibit the 
trade of opium within China.  Similar to Imperial edicts, after the governor-general of Canton 
proclaimed the prohibition of the opium trade in 1799, it was reiterated by the governor-general 
in 1809, 1822, 1823, 1831, and again in 1832.79  The Imperial court also echoed support of these 
edicts in 1817 and 1831.80  Even the Hoppo issued an edict prohibiting the trade of opium on 
May 9th, 1831 and again on April 13th of 1832.81  Undoubtedly created with the intention of 
reminding and compelling local officials to eradicate the opium trade in China, its repetition 
amidst a rise in imports illustrates the stark contrast between the policy statements of the 
government and its ability to implement policy that would actually curtail the illicit opium trade.  
Indeed, these edicts were by and large statements of opinion rather than policies that provided 
solutions. 
By June of 1831, the Emperor felt as though he could not adequately address the opium 
issue personally.  Hence, he sanguinely proclaimed that “the several governors-general, 
governors, prefects, and magistrates were required to file annual bonds to the effect that there 
was no one smoking opium” within their areas of jurisdiction.82  Widespread corruption among 
officials who aided the lucrative opium trade fueled policies targeting malfeasance of officials.  
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More importantly, the edicts symbolize the Imperial court’s inability to truly address the opium 
issue: the court could not even count on the cooperation of many Confucian scholar-officials in 
standing against the illicit trade. Undoubtedly there was a stark increase in enforcement as 
evidenced by the approximately 2000 opium dealers, brokers and smokers who were 
incarcerated by December 1838.83 As of May 1839, the enforced punishment for brokers of 
opium was beheading, opium den owners and bribed officials were strangled to death, and users 
were given 18 months to cease usage or face strangulation.84  But their efforts to punish opium 
users and traders did little to impact the overall suppression of the opium trade nor did they 
improve their diplomatic or economic position with the foreign traders. 
Ultimately, the Chinese reaction to trade with the west demonstrated not only closed-
mindedness, but also inadaptability.  The western merchants, like those from the British East 
India Company, were used to the concept of free trade and more open lines of diplomacy.  In 
examining the causes of the outbreak of war in 1840, there are certainly many inter-related 
factors that weave a complex picture.  However, in examining the operations of the Company at 
Canton in the year leading up to the end of its monopoly on trade, there are many indications that 
it was the loss of the monopoly that ultimately unleashed a series of changes of management, 
which coupled with a pervading mismanagement escalated the tensions to armed conflict.
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Chapter 2- The Final Year of the British East India Company at Canton, 1833-1834 
In South-East China, just up the Pearl river from the Gulf of Canton, existed the epicenter 
of foreign trade and relations for the Chinese Celestial Empire: Canton.  The city itself was 
enclosed by a crumbling, yet generally imposing wall.  Directly to the east of the city existed a 
tiny settlement at which China conducted its foreign trade.  A more detailed description 
illustrated that: 
It takes [] 270 steps to cross the land from east to west, and fewer still from north to 
south.  Along the southern edge of their domain, where the Pearl River flows, there is a 
patch of open ground, and this the Westerners call their ‘square’ or ‘esplanade.’   But 50 
paces from the shore rise the solid fronts of the building where they live, and this fill 
almost all the space remaining, save for three narrow streets that intersect them from 
north to south, closed at night by gates.85 
 
 There were thirteen factories, or ‘hongs,’ that were rented to the foreign merchants by the 
Cohong so they could conduct business.  All of the buildings had been rebuilt after the 
conflagration of 1822.  By the early 1830s, though, they were furnished with the finest amenities 
procured from the vast trading networks of the Western merchants who inhabited them.  The 
largest of the factories was the one rented to the British East India Company, indicative of the 
disproportionately large volume of trade transacted with the British. Not being an arm of the 
British government, the Company was managed by the Court of Directors in London.  However, 
at Canton the Company was managed by the Select Committee, which was lead by a 
President86—its records being managed by the Secretary. 
 The settlement was divided into four, unequal blocks by three streets, lined with 
countless shops.  The widest of them, Old China Street, was only twelve feet wide, while New 
China Street and Hog Lane were slightly slimmer.  They were so narrow that in walking through 
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them during the day one would find it very difficult to move through the crowd.  The streets 
were replete with “Buddhist nuns with shaven heads, Taoist and Buddhist priests, 
ratcatchers…fortune-tellers, itinerant doctors [and] money changers” among others.87  There 
certainly existed a bustling commerce outside of the voluminous trade of the Company.  
However, no matter what item a foreigner purchased, they were still required to obtain the 
official seal from a vendor on an invoice, or the goods would not be allowed to leave Canton.  
The Chinese were incredibly strict about the regulation of trade. 
 Communication was certainly an issue for the merchants as, around the 1830s, there were 
no Chinese at Canton who could read or write any European language—and only a handful of 
westerners who were literate in Chinese.  The Chinese did, however, employ official linguists. 
They spoke Pidgin English, a hybrid of Portuguese, English, Indian dialects and various Chinese 
dialects.  Together they would comprise a language which would largely be incomprehensible to 
those who were skilled in each individual language.  Yet, the linguists became an integral part of 
the Canton trade and all foreigners knew them by name.  Communication would eventually 
become an issue in 1834, when the Company’s language experts were relocated after the loss of 
the its monopoly on the China trade. 
 During the Company’s monopoly on the Chinese trade, its factory housed its business 
and daily affairs in the East.  However, the westerners were only allowed to remain at the Canton 
factory during the trading season, from November to March.  From April until October the 
company and its affairs would be relocated to the Portuguese settlement of Macao, 65 miles to 
the south.88  Undoubtedly, the constant relocation of the foreigners who administered the China 
trade for years at a time was a cumbersome way of life.  The situation was particularly trying for 
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those who had wives and families who had to remain behind at Macao when trade resumed at 
Canton in November. 
 
Western Views of China 
Before describing the state of affairs at Canton in the year leading up to the loss of the 
Company’s monopoly on the China trade, it is important to get a sense of how the Chinese and 
westerners viewed each other around the 1830s.  During the time of the 15th century explorers, 
Europeans tended “to elevate China above all the civilizations that they had ‘discovered.’”89  By 
the mid-seventeenth century there were works published in Europe lauding China as being 
largely responsible for “mankind’s basic technology.”90  Travelers spoke of the breadth of the 
marvelous creations of the Chinese ranging from printing and paper to immense public works 
projects.  However, as the enlightenment and industrial revolution fundamentally changed 
Europe, it also affected their view on Chinese civilization.91   
 The French philosophes began to exhibit an admonishing tone toward the Chinese that 
had not been previously witnessed.  Montesquieu, Diderot, d’Holbach and Helvetius all 
criticized the “despotic authority on Chinese character and commerce.”92  Even Voltaire, who 
had once praised the moral superiority of the Confucian, Chinese society began to have his own 
doubts.  There was a growing sense that Europe was surpassing the Chinese civilization both in 
terms of technology and enlightened thought.  As more and more travelers, missionaries and 
members of embassies traveled to China, the subsequent assessments of Chinese civilization 
grew progressively negative.   
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Especially after the diplomatic mission led by Lord Macartney in 1793, the attitudes 
toward the Chinese shifted.93  Westerners began to see the Chinese as unyielding, arrogant, 
condescending, intolerable and on a cultural decline.  Additionally, Europeans were very critical 
that they were not industrialized, did not seek to truly embrace the scientific and intellectual 
revolutions, and fundamentally rejected free trade.  At the turn of the 19th century, it became 
clear that the pervading beliefs about China held by diplomats, travelers, missionaries and 
intelligentsia grew increasingly negative.   
However, what most affected relations between Chinese and Westerners were the legal 
and political conflicts that surrounded the Canton trade.  In reference to the Company traders, 
“what bothered the English was the very nature of Chinese justice.”94  Essentially, Chinese law 
seemed to primarily center around criminal law. The Chinese courts seemed more concerned 
with issuing punishment and finding a scapegoat, rather than a forum to pursue truth and justice.  
Especially as these traders viewed themselves as agents of free trade seeking wealth, the 
seemingly unfair laws, processes and punishments became not only irritating: they were 
sometimes deadly. 
The most famous case of conflict between western and Chinese law occurred in 1821.  
An American ship called the Emily was trading with local Chinese who would guide their trade-
boats alongside the ship.  A crewmember named Terranova accidentally knocked a pitcher off 
the deck, landing directly on a Chinese fruit seller.  Unfortunately, she fell overboard and 
drowned.  The Chinese demanded that the ‘murderer’ be turned over to the authorities, but the 
American captain remained firm and demanded that the trial be held aboard the Emily.  The 
Chinese officials would not yield and instead threatened to end all American trade at Canton if 
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they did not provide the authorities with the culprit.  With little choice, the captain handed 
Terranova over to the Chinese.  He was tried with no Westerners present, found guilty and 
executed the following day.95  The westerners had good reason to be fearful, and even resentful, 
of Chinese law. 
 The Chinese, on the other hand, viewed their civilization as the center of the world.  
Beyond referring to their nation as the Middle Kingdom, they believed that they had all the 
technological and intellectual prowess they needed to administer their empire.  In 
correspondences written by Chinese officials, they consistently referred to foreigners as 
‘barbarians.’  Further, they did not see any benefits to be gained from interacting or trading with 
foreigners.  Instead, they viewed the trade as some sort of act of pitiful benevolence by their 
virtuous, Confucian society.  It was the westerners who needed the tea, porcelain and rhubarb—
the Chinese were content with just receiving silver and controlling their trade.  Typifying this 
pervading Chinese moral superiority and call for western submission, in a letter to Queen 
Victoria in 1839, Canton Commissioner Lin Zexu wrote: 
The kings of your honorable country by tradition handed down from generation to 
generation have always been noted for their politeness and submissiveness…But after a 
long period of commercial intercourse, there appear among the crowd of barbarians both 
good persons and bad, unevenly…Our Celestial Dynasty rules over and supervises the 
myriad states and surely possess unfathomable spiritual dignity…May you, O King, 
check your wicked and sift out your vicious people before they come to China in order to 
guarantee the peace of your nation, to show further the sincerity of your politeness and 
submissiveness.96 
 
 It was amidst this conflict of world-view that the British East India Company cautiously 
managed the fragile trading relationship between Britain and China.  In examining the final year 
of their operation as the sole traders with the Cohong, we can examine not only the difficulties of 
managing the China trade, but also the internal issues of managing the Company; the relationship 
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with the Hong merchants; and some substantial legal problems that jeopardized the political 
stability of Britain’s tenuous relationship with the Chinese.  It is important, though, to first 
examine Chinese attitudes towards the foreign trade. 
 
Chinese Attitudes and views towards Trade 
 Undoubtedly the Canton Trade system was established because the Chinese were 
generally suspicious towards western trade and intensely protectionist against foreigners.  At the 
top of their list of primary concerns was the illicit trading of opium in China.  It not only 
threatened to drain the coffers of their treasuries but more importantly threatened China’s ability 
to control its citizens and economy.   In that vein, they also were adamant that edicts from all 
Qing officials were strictly followed, demonstrating their supreme authority. 
 In a letter to the Select Committee at the end of the 1832/1833 trading season, the Senior 
Hong Merchant Howqua passed along warnings from Qing Officials regarding trade along the 
coast.  An English ship had been spotted at ports in Fujian, Zhejiang, Shandong and Jiangsu.   
Leagues away from Canton, these ports were explicitly off-limits to the foreign trade.  Since the 
stated rules were violated, the Committee witnessed the contempt felt by the Chinese merchants 
towards the westerners’ “vulgar hope of trading” in the North in a letter delivered on March 8th, 
1833.97  The message ended with a call to the foreigners to obey Chinese laws and to not trespass 
in ports they are not permitted to trade in. 
 On March 20th, the Hong merchants again sent a concerned message to the Committee 
regarding a British ship called the Sylph.  The ship was also found trading along the coast and the 
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Chinese authorities were calling for the Company to “implicitly obey and control the ships.”98 As 
if the Company was unaware, the letter commands that Canton is the only port in which 
foreigners can engage in trade with the licensed Cohong merchants and compliance was 
“absolutely necessary.”99  By May, the Hoppo warned the Company that the awareness of ships 
proceeding north had “opened the eyes of the Pekin100 government” to the possibility that 
foreigners were disregarding Chinese trade law.101  Ultimately, in redundant reiterations of 
previous laws, local authorities were instructed to increase their vigilance towards westerners in 
order to prevent them from traveling north. 
 The Chinese consistently sought obedience of their lawas, but were particularly keen on 
upholding laws relating to foreign trade.  For instance, in early March 1833 the authorities at Kae 
cho punished a soldier who failed to guard the entrance of the Keenqantaou River.  Foreigners 
had landed and entered the city, a clear breach of Chinese law. When questioned by Changpan 
Kew, the district magistrate, the soldier explained a “fallacious” story about a foreigner who was 
sick and dying, thus needing to be granted entrance.  Because of his “evasive and fictitious 
report” he was promptly dismissed from service.102  Evidently, the Chinese officials were ready 
to punish Chinese for infractions of foreign trade laws—even minor ones. 
 Later in the summer of 1833, smuggling became an issue that was brought to the 
attention of the Select Committee.  A British man named Markwick was caught smuggling 14 
boxes of silk and 4 boxes of miscellaneous goods on the Northern Coast of China.103 The Hoppo 
investigated into the matter further and found that Markwick and Edwards had “in violation of 
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the law each built a sanpan boat” to surreptitiously travel back and forth from Canton to various 
ships and trading outposts throughout the Gulf of Canton.104  This was a problem because they 
could deceivingly appear to be Chinese shop traders and not be examined by customs—thus, 
they could smuggle at Canton and other cities along the coast.  The Hoppo chose to resolve the 
situation by politely ordering that the sanpan boat be destroyed, appealing the Committee to join 
them in their disbelief of Markwick’s mischievous cunning. 
 Ultimately, Chinese views towards the trade centered around their protectionist foreign 
policy.  Still, Westerners were shocked that the Chinese would not open up their trade in a way 
that would allow both parties to mutually increase their wealth and power.  Even when a British 
ship anchored on June 25th in the Gulf of Canton—deciding whether or not to proceed to 
Whampoa to unload cargo—the Chinese immediately required information on the cargo, sailors 
and weaponry.  When the Captain, perhaps new to the China trade (or perhaps smuggling 
opium), “refused to tell the facts” to the authorities, they reacted quickly.  The ship was to be 
forced to return to its origin as “pretexts for lingering about and occasioning disturbance” were 
not permitted by the Chinese.105  Surely, the ship could have been carrying tons of opium or 
other illicit goods, but the Chinese were very quick to compel the ship to leave China. 
 Perhaps as a reaction, on July 8th the Hoppo informed the Company that it had decided to 
enforce a categorical policy:  
All foreign merchants having disposed of their goods and obtained principal shall be 
ordered according to the time to go back to their respective nations in the original ship in 
which they came.106 
 
 The Hoppo clearly wanted to send a message, especially in light of the increased reports 
of smuggling and illicit trade along the Coast.  However, the Hoppo may have also been 
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responding to the mounting pressure from the Emperor and his court to demonstrate control of 
the foreign trade, especially the mounting issue of opium.  Since foreigners generally imported 
China’s opium, most of the Imperial edicts relating to foreigners or opium were one and the 
same. 
Beginning with Yongzheng’s 1729 Edict banning the consumption and selling of opium, 
the Qing repeatedly issued edicts reiterating the ban on opium trade and eventually would issue 
edicts that touched upon foreign trade in general.  Having already examined the principal edicts 
prohibiting the trade of opium, here we turn to the policies that affected foreign trade at Canton. 
The first of these invasive measures to better regulate foreign trade came in 1815, when 
the Emperor proclaimed that Portuguese ships at Macao could be searched for opium.107  This 
policy was expanded in 1820 when the imperial court placed further pressure on the regulation of 
the opium trade by giving the Hong merchants the ability to search all foreign ships.  Coupled 
with the power to search all ships was the responsibility the Hong merchants assumed for any 
opium shipments that they failed to confiscate.108  Specifically, if they did not catch an opium 
shipment the Hong merchants would be blamed for being complicit in its trade.  If the regulation 
of the trade became particularly difficult, the Qing would exercise the short-term solution of 
expelling all foreign ships from the vicinity of Canton.  An example of this was at the start of the 
1821-1822 trading season when the Emperor ordered all foreign ships away from Canton and the 
Governor-General of Canton issued a reiterating order.109 
Hearing of incidents in which foreigners traveled north to trade in unauthorized ports, the 
Emperor would primarily react with edicts.  For example, in 1828 the Daoguang Emperor 
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decreed that all foreign ships at Fujian, Jiangsu and Zhejiang were to depart immediately.110  It 
was already illegal for foreigners to trade at these ports, so it proved to be futile in eradicating 
the illicit trade.  When the Emperor again issued an edict expelling all foreigners from the 
Shandong coast in 1832, the foreigners were still not given further disincentives to smuggle 
goods north.111  Interestingly, amidst the failure of previous redundant reiterations of policy, the 
Qing continued to use these edicts as their primary strategy to deal with the issues relating to 
foreign trade.  The edicts may have historically been proven to be effective in China’s Confucian 
society, but the officials did not adapt their methods when addressing an issue that involved 
foreigners and an addictive narcotic. 
Accordingly, the Chinese were growing increasingly frustrated as opium began to pour 
into China in a previously unfathomable volume in the 1830s.  Their strategy of using moral 
arguments and strong statements to better control the foreign trade—and suppress the opium 
trade—was simply not effective.  The main issue with the way the Chinese managed their trade 
and foreign relations was their inability to adapt.  They mistakenly believed that the power and 
moral authority of the emperor and his officials would be enough to control foreigners at their 
ports.  Worse than their misunderstanding was their complete disinterest in learning about the 
perspective of the westerners.  It was their unyielding stubborn attitude towards the foreigners 
that would ultimately result in their reacting poorly to foreigners who might possess a similar 
arrogance or stubbornness after the Company lost its monopoly.   While the Company exhibited 
understanding and humility in their relationship with the Chinese, they too had difficulties 
managing their trade at Canton. 
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Difficulties of Managing the Company at Canton 
 Those who were in Canton on behalf of the Company in the 1830s came from vastly 
different walks of life. There were wealthy administrators of the Company, captains of vessels 
that sailed the world, ex-convicts who fled England only to join crews that smuggled goods into 
China, and family members traveling with their husbands and fathers.  Being far from the nearest 
source of British authority—Fort William in Singapore—the Company’s Select Committee at 
Canton was responsible for not just regulating trade and managing company affairs, but also was 
held responsible for the subjects of the British Crown living at Canton.  Interestingly, though, 
they had no legal authority other than being the official regulators of trade. 
 Since the Chinese highly valued titles and clear lines of authority, the President of the 
Select Committee of the Company not only governed the affairs of the company but was also 
considered the taipan, or “headman for the entire English community.”112  Private traders did 
not, however, consider him their leader.   Still, it was the Company who provided ships with 
licenses to conduct trade on behalf of the English.  Thus, merchants were forced to (at times) 
treat the Select Committee as their administrative leaders and sometimes even rely on the 
committee to protect them in cases of conflict with the Chinese. 
 This double standard could sometimes be quite difficult for the committee to manage.  
For instance, on July 20th of 1833, representatives of the recently-formed Jardine Matheson 
company wrote to the Select Committee inquiring into the reason why they had withdrawn the 
license from the ship called the Hercules.113  The Committee immediately retorted that the 
Hercules’s Captain, a man named Grant, had not followed Company regulations and had 
distributed mail received from Calcutta before it could be processed by the steward.  Thus, in 
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their view, there should be no surprise that the license was withdrawn.114  Demonstrating that 
Jardine Matheson & Company did not agree with the ruling or the leadership of the Committee, 
Jardine Matheson responded again.  This time they challenged the Select Committee in two 
separate letters, resulting in the Committee to meet in full and discuss the matter on August 1st.115 
The Select Committee ultimately decided to uphold its withdrawal of the license for the 
Hercules. 
 Jardine Matheson & Company continued to argue that the Committee’s belief that 
Captain Grant had violated company procedure was simply unfounded due to being “hearsay.”116  
The Select committee again refused to yield believing they had sufficiently asserted their 
authority on the trifling matter by August 12th.  Captain Grant, however, decided to appeal to the 
British authorities at Fort William.  Without regard for the decision of the Select Committee, and 
in direct contradiction with their decision, the secretary at Singapore granted him the license to 
trade.117  It was a demonstration of the frustrating reality that while the Company was the agent 
of foreign relations and trade with the Chinese, there were times when country traders attempted 
to circumvent the Company’s authority.  This was particularly salient to the concerns of the 
Committee because while the Company did endorse its own illicit trade of opium but was 
painstakingly careful to distance themselves from the trade ‘officially.’  Private traders clumsily 
being caught with opium jeopardized the Company’s legitimate trade. 
 The overt challenge from Jardine Matheson was also indicative of a growing trend of 
private traders disrespecting the established rules of the company and attempting to use licensed 
ships to engage in illicit trade.  In the fall of 1832, Jardine Matheson commissioned a ship called 
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the Sylph to explore what sort of profits they could generate by trading along the Chinese coast.  
Arriving at Macao in September, the Sylph unloaded some of the opium it had transported from 
Calcutta and immediately departed for its venture north.  After two months of travel, the ship 
reached the coast of Manchuria during the particularly cold month of November.118  A German 
protestant missionary aboard the Sylph named Charles Gutzlaff recalled a story that may be 
indicative of how the smugglers viewed and treated the Chinese.  Sailing past the delta of the 
Yangzte River, they came upon 12 Chinese whose ship had been dismasted and was thus 
immobile.  The Sylph’s crew refused to help them “until they dropped overboard the image of 
their patron saint and promised to adore the true God.”119 
 In the early months of 1833, while the Sylph was returning to Canton, the Select 
Committee was again being pressured by the Chinese to stop the illicit trading along the coast.  
In a Company document recorded on March 20th, the Committee acknowledged receiving word 
from the Chinese that the Sylph had been witnessed leaving “the coast of Keangsoo120 on the 5th 
January.”121 While being pressured by the Chinese, the Committee was also well aware of 
another Jardine Matheson ship that was set to both search for the Sylph and further examine the 
opium trade along the coast.  Although it was clear that allowing its voyage was fundamentally 
against company policy to comply with the Chinese, the Committee did not “consider it 
necessary” to alert the Chinese.122 Perhaps their inaction signified the Committee’s 
acknowledgement of its lack of true influence—or maybe their lack of interest in complying with 
the Chinese—with private merchants like those at Jardine Matheson. 
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 These sorts of excursions resulted in the Chinese conveying additional pressure and a 
sense of urgency to the Company.  The Governor of Canton wrote to the Hong Merchants 
declaring that “if the said foreign vessel arrive at Canton he do immediately enjoin these 
commands and enforce sufficient obedience to the regulations of the Celestial Empire.”123  
Presumably he meant an expulsion of the ship from China.  Certainly, the inability of the 
committee to control British ships made it more difficult to serve as the representative authority 
of the British to the Chinese.  But the Sylph was to continue to cause more problems for the 
Select Committee.   
 The Committee received word on May 2nd that some English seamen had caused 
disturbances in North Macao.  It turned out that the men had recently been discharged from the 
Sylph.  Consequently, the Committee hastily wrote to Captain Wallace of the Sylph and ordered 
him to “immediately receive these men again on board [his] vessel.”124  Without responding to 
this request, a week later the Sylph applied to have its license renewed to continue trade.  
Naturally, the Committee instantly denied the renewal until their direct orders were obeyed.125 
 Captain Wallace took ten days to submit a formal reply, in which he denied that the 
seamen who caused a disturbance originated from the Sylph.  He instead suggested that they 
were “discharged from an American ship.” 126  He feared taking responsibility for them because 
of the fine he would have to pay if any of them were left ashore in India on their voyage home. 
The response from the committee was quick and focused on the need of the committee to 
establish its authority.  Undoubtedly sparked by the potential political ramifications that could 
occur from having a Company-licensed ship licensed caught smuggling opium—or British 
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seamen implicated in public disturbances—the Committee again rejected the renewal of the 
license.127 
 Finally, Captain Wallace sent an apology to the Select Committee for having “been the 
cause of annoyance” and humbly suggested that it may have been due to a 
“misunderstanding.”128  However, it was not until the committee was given assurance that the 
seamen from the Sylph were removed from China and would quit the China trade that they would 
consider the renewal of the license.129  Apparently, for all the headache the incident had caused 
the members of the Committee, they merely needed a verbal assurance of the obedience of their 
order to be appeased, almost demonstrating an admission of not possessing much power.  Clearly 
it was quite difficult to be in the position of power to determine licenses without having 
significant authority over individual traders who did not directly work for the Company.  It was 
almost as though the Committee was treated as a formality by the private traders who were only 
tangentially affiliated with the Company’s trade.  Yet, the Company was consistently pressured 
by the Chinese who believed them to be in full control of British subjects.  When the Company 
was not able to deliver compliance to Chinese proclamations, the Company’s lack of authority 
threatened the entirety of the British relations with the Chinese. 
 In a related, but different, incident following the Sylph affair, the Company had to take on 
the role of arbiters of the law in the case of an alleged conspiracy to commandeer the ship called 
the H.C. Cutter.  It was in a memo recorded on May 27th that the Select Committee was alerted 
of a plot to seize a British ship at Macao.  Interestingly, the conspirators were purported to have 
been British and American sailors who were organized by a British sailor named Henry Steele.  
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Believing that issues relating to the Sylph were in the past, the Committee was no doubt shocked 
to learn that five members of the crew of the Sylph were implicated in this plot.130 
 Indicative of the uncertainty surrounding the rising issue, initially the only testimony 
came from a Sylph crewmember named David Brown—who sat idly in a Portuguese jail at 
Macao for drunken and disorderly behavior.  Fortunately he had sobered up enough to posses the 
“utmost readiness to state all he know on the subject.”131  The narrative he painted, though, was 
viewed with guarded suspicion: 
 According to Brown, Steele was the second officer aboard the Sir George Murray, which 
landed at Macao shortly before the time of his deposition.  Upon arriving, he entered a lodge for 
westerners in the evening between the hours of 8 and 9 and immediately began to invite sailors 
to join him in his plot to seize the H.C. Cutter.  In the growing heat and humidity of a Spring 
evening in Southern China, Steele approached Brown and “did all in his power to induce” Brown 
to join the scheme.  First, he employed social pressure on Brown, claiming that “all the European 
Seamen then at Macao” were interested in this sort of endeavor.  A colleague, Mr. McDougall, 
also joined their conversation and urged Brown to join them in their conspiracy.132  
 They appealed to Brown’s avarice by enticing him with the riches that could be achieved 
through the trade both along the China coast and at Japan.  Reassuringly, Steele claimed “he was 
well acquainted with the coast and the trade, was an officer and could navigate and would 
navigate all charge of” their commandeered vessel. 
 Brown was certainly intrigued by the plan.  Feeling the pressure of the two men, he 
agreed to join them in seizing the Cutter.  However, waking up the next morning, infused with 
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the clarity that accompanied sobriety, Brown reconsidered the ramifications of the plan and 
ultimately “refused to have anything to do with the business.” 133  Not surprisingly, Steele was 
irritated by his withdrawal from their cabal.  He attempted to convince Brown yet again, but to 
no avail—or so the deponent claimed. 
 Two days later, on May 29th, the Committee received the testimony from two other 
members of the Sylph, Edward Boyd and Richard Cooper, who were implicated in the plot.  
Giving his deposition aboard the ship Hercules, off the coast of Lintin, Boyd recounted the 
events of a fortnight previous.  Apparently, David Brown had approached him saying that he and 
others had formed a plan “to seize and run away with the H.C. cutter.”  Further, Brown invited 
Boyd to join their makeshift crew, because Boyd would “complete a crew” to be able to sail and 
trade along the coast of China.  Boyd claimed to have immediately refused any association 
whatsoever with the conspirators, but had been sworn to secrecy by Brown to keep their plan 
private.  Yet, it still seemed like a number of Europeans at Macao were well aware of the 
conspiracy—a sign of poor planning for such a risky endeavor.134  Boyd’s fellow crewmember, 
Cooper, had little to add.  He merely stated that Brown had been “the leader in the conspiracy,” 
and in his conversation with Brown he had heard that a man by the name McDougall was also 
involved.  Beyond this, however, Cooper claimed to know nothing at all.135 
 Luckily for the Company, that very day they also received a deposition from John 
McDougall.  He indicated that he was initially convinced to join the conspirators in their plot.  
Somehow, though, he began to doubt the probability of success as the plan moved closer and 
closer towards being implemented.  In the eleventh hour, when five or six of his cohorts (among 
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them a man named Brown) and him were gathered together, he “found it was [his] best plan to 
keep them from executing their plan.” 136  So he clandestinely provided them with drinks so that 
they became too intoxicated to carry out their plan with any hope of success.  By the next 
morning, the plot had been exposed, the men were arrested and their dreams of smuggling had 
been foiled.  McDougall, proudly ending his deposition, asserted resolutely that Henry Steele 
was the “leader of the whole” group.137 
 Having heard the breadth of these depositions, the Committee determined that the best 
course of action would be to appeal to the Portuguese authorities to detain Steele at Macao.  
They hoped that he would then be able to be questioned and extradited to England for a more 
proper legal process.  They indicated in a letter to the Governor of Macao138 that he had engaged 
in “conspiracy” and plotted in “an act of piracy on the coast of China.”139  The Portuguese 
complied and he was quickly extradited as a prisoner to Singapore on board a Company vessel 
called the Forth.140 
 This placed the committee in a terribly awkward position of having to coordinate legal 
depositions aboard their ships, using captains as their chief inspectors.  At the same time, they 
were painfully aware of their lack of true authority.  They had to rely on the Portuguese to 
extradite anyone from Macao.  Sadly, their authority was arguably weaker at Chinese-controlled 
Canton.  It was also interesting that there was no record of what occurred to the deponents who 
collectively seemed to implicate Steele and Brown as the masterminds behind the plot.  Instead, 
the Committee clearly came to the conclusion that Steele was the culprit in this case, and 
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appealed to local authorities to allow his extradition as a prisoner.  It was also a burden on the 
Company’s resources, which seemed to be stretched as captains served as inspectors and ships 
were utilized to provide convoys for prisoners like Steele. 
 Another example of the Company having to act as the legal authority occurred in April of 
1834, around the time of the loss of the Company’s monopoly in China.  Late on the night of 
April 6th, a man arrived at the home of Select Committee President Daniels’ home.  He knocked 
on the door and introduced himself as Philip.  Those who met him describe him as man short in 
stature, with dark eyes and a “sharp chin.”  It was his thinning hair and worn teeth, though, that 
betrayed his age of about 50.141  He explained that he had been a member of the crew of the 
Dolphin, from Liverpool, and had served 74 tours with the ship.  Not a few months earlier, the 
ship had found itself wrecked off the coast of an island called Moea.  Being stranded there, he 
and his crew lived among the natives for months until they procured a boat.  He used the boat to 
travel to Manila where he joined the crew of a Spanish vessel that had just delivered him to 
Macao.   
With no reason to doubt Philip’s story, President Daniels charitably gave him some clean 
clothes, a bit of money and directions to a tavern where Daniels would have him housed on the 
Company’s purse.  Four days later, seven of Philip’s comrades also arrived from Manila, 
traveling in separate ships.  Interestingly, though, when they were each questioned about the 
particulars of their stories a number of inconsistencies began to emerge.  So many, in fact, that 
within the Company “suspicions began to arise as to the character” of the men.142 
 The Select Committee, having financially supported Philip, decided to dig a bit deeper to 
ascertain the truth about Philip and his colleagues.  An investigation into the life of Philip 
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yielded that he was born in Cornwall to a large family, but was currently unmarried.  His 
occupation for the preceding 29 years was a seafarer.  On his most recent departure from 
England he left Liverpool in April of 1829 conveying a salt cargo to Newfoundland.  Thereafter 
he traveled to Rhio Janeiro143 to sell Codfish.   
In September of 1831, Philip left South America and traveled to the Far East, stopping at 
various islands through his travels in the Pacific.  It was on February 15th of 1834 that the 
Dolphin wrecked off the coast of Moea.  Philip described that the chief-mate and a young boy on 
the ship had perished in the waters.  He also claimed that there were no surviving logs or written 
proof of the vessel, save for a “broken quadrant and a compass.”144  Once shipwrecked on Moea, 
they were pleasantly surprised to find that the brown-skinned, straight haired natives, while 
nearly naked, were friendly.  Yet, even in Philips recounting of his story he demonstrates his 
propensity to distort the truth for his own benefit.  The Committee indicated that the figures 
denoting the tonnage of the Dolphin were altered from 74 to 274 at Manila to appear to have 
sailed with more cargo.  Upon arriving at Macao, the same document denoting the tonnage had 
again been changed back to stating 74 tons.   
One of Philip’s cronies, named William Goswell, also provided a slightly different 
version of the story.  His account matched Philip’s through his recalling the wrecking of the 
Dolphin.  However, the discrepancies in his story added to the mounting suspicions that the 
Committee had towards Philip, even though they were minimal.  For instance, he believed that 
more documents had been saved from the ships wreckage and described the natives of Moea as 
having “thick wolly hair”—small details, to be sure, but significant enough to raise questions.145   
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 Amidst the mounting doubts the Committee had in the validity of the men’s stories, they 
become increasingly convinced that they were fugitive convicts from New South Wales, 
Australia.  However, in addition to not having the authority to try or punish British subjects, the 
committee concurred that as British subjects it was their duty to “keep faith with them” and not 
jump to any premature conclusions.146  To respect their weak authority and to protect some 
semblance of due process, the company wrote to the nearby Macao Senate warning them of the 
potential danger posed by the sailors.  They recommended that the Senate “place 
Portuguese…Authorities on their guard” until more light could be shed on the nebulous 
situation.147 
 Captain Robson, an acquaintance of Philip’s father, provided more testimony regarding 
his character.  Apparently, Philip ruined his father’s business as a Mediterranean seafarer by 
poorly commanding a small ship called the Camilla.  Even though the circumstances weren’t 
clear, Robson believed that “under the facts,” Philip was likely the man he knew.148  Still not 
having certainty, the Committee continued to seek out more testimony. 
 Three days later, on April 19th, the Company heard word that a man named Captain 
Stevens knew Philip.  He was the captain of the Mermaid, which had just arrived at Lintin from 
Calcutta, and claimed to remember “perfectly” a man named Philip matching the Committee’s 
description.  Stevens had captained a ship called the Auggle, where he met the “notorious” 
Philip.  Stevens recounted that the crime Philip was convicted of at New South Wales was that of 
conspiring to commandeer the Auggle while it was out at sea.149  The Company sent Stevens to 
                                                 
146 East India Company Factory Records: April 12, 1834 
147 East India Company Factory Records: April 16, 1834 
148 East India Company Factory Records: April 16, 1834 
149 East India Company Factory Records: April 23, 1834 
 41 
Macao to make a positive identification of the man.  Shortly thereafter, he confirmed that the 
man was, indeed, the fugitive convict he had known from New South Wales.150 
 President Daniels and the Secretary wasted no time in calling upon the Governor of 
Macao to allow Stevens’ confirmation of his identity to translate to immediate imprisonment, 
due to the man’s previous crimes.  However, the Governor found it quite improper to imprison a 
man for crimes committed outside his nation, citing that sort of action as being “inconsistent with 
the law of nations.”151  Frustrated with their lack of true political clout, the Committee was 
forced to appeal to the agents of the British Crown at Singapore.  It was only these agents of the 
crown who had a chance to strike a political deal with the Portuguese authorities at Macao. 
 The issue remained unresolved by the close of the 1833-1834 trading season, the last 
season of the Company’s monopoly at Canton.  Nevertheless, this incident further highlights 
how difficult it was for the company to manage internal issues due to the political constraints and 
limits to its actual authority over the British at Canton.  While they were dealing with an 
immense and fragile trade relationship with the Chinese, it was these internal struggles that 
threatened to weaken not only the Company but also Britain’s immense trade operation in China. 
 Another interesting case of the Company having to cede to other authorities involves 
freedom of speech in Macao.  The Governor of Macao, in the summer of 1833, wrote a letter to 
the Select Committee on behalf of a Catholic Priest named Vigauo Capular.  Father Capular was 
concerned that a British citizen at Macao operated “a press which he [used] for the publication of 
certain works contrary to the Doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.” 152  The publication was 
evangelist and protestant, while Portugal was a Catholic country.  Further, in Portuguese 
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territories the use of the press is not allowed unless sanctioned by the Crown.  Thus, because the 
King of Portugal was intensely Catholic, publishing any protestant work would not be permitted 
in Portuguese-controlled territory. 
Not surprisingly, the company acknowledged that they understood the law and 
immediately ordered the man to “suspend the issue of any further publications” at Macao.153 
Clearly the Company was operating during the summer at Macao under the auspices of an 
agreement with the Portuguese authorities—an agreement stating that when they were not 
allowed to operate out of their factory at Canton they were permitted to operate at Macao.  Even 
when operating under the territorial-command of the Portuguese, the Company still remained in 
a weak position of actual authority. In this case, a question not answered by the official records 
of the Select Committee was whether or not their authority actually resulted in the cessation of 
printing by the British evangelist publisher.  Interestingly, it is not clear that the publisher would 
stop because of urging from the Company as a real incentive to desist would be because he 
feared legal retribution from the Portuguese. 
 When operating a company that interacted with suspicious and notorious characters, both 
on private smuggling vessels and Company ships, there were also internal crimes with which the 
Company was forced to deal.  For instance, on March 9th, 1834 Captain Ricketts of the Banque 
Austea informed the president of the Select Committee that a member of his crew had suddenly 
become violent.  He lunged at a fellow crewmember, slashing a knife at the man with “the intent 
to murder him.”154  In the heat of the trading season, while at Canton, Captain Ricketts really had 
no authorities to appeal to for this assault other than the Select Committee.  It was not clear what 
the Committee’s response to the situation was, but it appeared as though only within the 
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Company did they have authority.  Interestingly, it was not the only assault they dealt with that 
year.  In fact, a few weeks prior to the attempted murder, a high-profile assault occurred.  
Prominent private merchant and opium smuggler James Innes (who will resurface later in this 
chapter) assaulted Select Committee President John Daniels.  Surely enraged and intending to 
exact severe punishment for the assault, Daniels sought to have Innes extradited to Britain.  
However, there were no ships leaving for Britain during he height of the trading season.  Thus, 
the company had to wait to dispense with justice.155  Not having true legal or criminal powers, 
the Company was again reminded of its lack of authority.  Luckily for Innes, the company would 
lose any semblance of authority it might have had when, in April 1834, it lost its monopoly over 
the China trade.  Thus, Innes would emerge from this conflict unpunished. 
When examining how the Company operated at Canton, it is important to realize that 
while the company controlled the largest trade at Canton, it had no real political authority over 
the foreigners.  Only being able to issue and retract licenses for ships to be able to trade 
legitimately—knowing that British authorities at Singapore could overturn their decisions—left 
the Select Committee in a precarious position.  They were forced to humbly accept their inability 
to control the foreigners who they were ironically responsible for.  Frustratingly, the Chinese 
officials viewed the Company as the highest authority over the British trade at Canton and 
looked to them for supreme leadership over the foreigners.  They continually referred to them as 
the ‘representatives of [their] Honble nation.’  Luckily, though, the Hong merchants seemed to 
not only be understanding of their difficult situation, but would also try to protect their trade 
relationship by dealing with issues directly—keeping Chinese officials out of problems when it 
was possible.  Hence, the juxtaposition of the Company’s perceived power and their actual 
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authority meant that they had to manage their relationships with the Hong merchants and 
Chinese officials quite carefully.  To better dissect these relations, an examination of the 
Company’s interaction with the Hong merchants is necessary. 
 
Relationship with the Hong Merchants 
 The primary relationship between the British and the Chinese in China was between the 
Select Committee and the Hong merchants.  While they both had a monopoly on their respective 
trade, they had no choice but to work together.  This was especially true for the Hong merchants, 
who regarded their status as members of the Cohong as a burden, not a privilege.  As the Cohong 
brought immense amounts of silver into China, the Chinese government coerced many 
merchants to unwillingly join the Cohong and made it quite difficult to retire.  They were 
unwilling because bankruptcy was a common affliction for the merchants, so those who were 
able to trade for many years would quickly act on any opportunity to retire from the precarious 
trade.  Even the most successful and prominent of the Hong merchants, Howqua, attempted to 
retire in 1810, again in 1826, unsuccessfully in 1832 and was ultimately forced to continue 
trading until his death in 1843.156 
 Additionally, while the Cohong had a monopoly on the foreign trade, it in no way was a 
monopoly in itself.  The thirteen Hongs competed against each other and would trade on their 
own accounts—which is why some were richer and more successful than others.  The only 
collaboration among the Hong was their joining together to repay foreign debt (if one of the 
merchants could not pay back the foreigners) using their collective Consoo157 fund. The 
                                                 
156 Greenberg 51 
157 公所, gongsuo in Mandarin.  It was a fund financed by a 3% levy on foreign trade.  It was also used to finance 
gifts from the merchants to government officials like the Emperor. 
 45 
Company tended to treat the Hong merchants as one unit and made sure to trade with all of them, 
progressively, based on seniority.  Once private traders began to trade on their own with smaller, 
illicit traders at Canton, it would become clear that the Company actually lost money due to 
tariffs and the inefficiency of the trade with the Hong merchants—unbeknownst to the Company 
at the time.158 
 As was the case in many businesses, personal relationships surely had much impact on 
which Hongs traded with which merchants and how regularly.  For instance, Jardine Matheson & 
Company had a strong relationship with the Hong merchants Mowqua, Manhop and Hangtai.  
The clear advantage the Company had over private traders—in the minds of the Hong 
merchants—was that products from India “branded with the Company’s mark” were trusted far 
more than the goods provided by private traders.159  Although the desire of western goods—
besides opium—was lacking, the Company enjoyed a longstanding position as the main source 
of legitimate trade in the perspective of the Hong merchants. 
 The same was true about the way in which the British, both government and Company 
officials, viewed the Hong merchants.  The testimony of a man who traded with the merchants 
for twenty years wrote of them:  
As a body of merchants we found them able and reliable in their dealings, faithful to their 
contracts, and large-minded.  The monopoly they enjoyed could not have been in the 
hands of a more able, liberal or genial class of men.160 
 
 At the heart of the relationship between the Company and the Hong merchants was the 
mutual desire for continued trade and profits.  When potential legal crises emerge that may have 
provoked the Chinese government to intervene and exercise Chinese authority, the Hong 
merchants would largely attempt to deal with the situation with the Select Committee directly—
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as will be examined later in this chapter.  Conversely, when the Hong merchants encountered 
financial burdens, the Company would try to ensure continued competition between the Hongs 
by ensuring that they each survived financial crises. 
 For example, when four Hong merchants incurred millions of taels of debt between 1810 
and 1815, the Company stepped in to provide aid.  Ostensibly the Company did not aid the 
merchants for reasons of altruism: they depended on the Cohong for the tea trade and wanted to 
ensure many sources for the incredibly lucrative business.  With that in mind, in early 1814 the 
Select Committee loaned the various weakened Hongs 250,000 taels to pay off all their short-
term debts.161  But there were other Hong merchants who, being incredibly affluent never needed 
external financial assistance.  These Hongs continued to benefit from all foreign trade, making 
grand fortunes as large-scale providers of tea to the Western world.  The most extreme example 
of this was Howqua, who was estimated to be worth $26 million in 1834.  Some would even go 
so far as to say that “his was probably the largest mercantile fortune in the world at the time.”162 
 Beyond trade, there were political pressures from England for the Company to be 
compliant with Chinese rules, especially to protect the immensely important tea trade.  The 
Company Court of Directors in London wrote to the Select Committee in 1832, stressing that 
“the commerce between Great Britain and China is too valuable to be put to hazard without the 
most urgent and imperious necessity.”163  It was apparent, though, that after 1829 the company 
had distanced itself enough from illicit trade that it could be generally said that “no foreign 
merchant except the East India Company had traded in conformity to Chinese proclamations.”164  
No doubt it was this sort of relationship that allowed the Select Committee and the Hong 
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merchants to be collaborative and amiable.  This would also be quite antithetical to the actions 
and attitudes of the first British superintendent of trade after the loss of the Company’s 
monopoly. 
 Much of this collaborative relationship manifests itself in the records of the Company in 
the final year of its prominence in China.  The Cohong acted as neutral intermediaries between 
the British and the Chinese government, sending along documents.  This is exemplified in their 
note to the Select Committee on April 23rd, 1833: 
We some time ago received the committee’s answer and immediately reported the tenor 
thereof to government, we have now received the governor’s reply and send a copy 
praying the committee to examine it and act accordingly.165 
 
 The Hong merchants also constantly notified and updated the Company on news from 
within the Cohong that affected the British merchants.  When, in June of 1833, the Hoppo 
approved two new linguists to aid communication at Canton, the Hong merchants respectfully 
notified and requested consent from the Company.166  Moreover, later that same month the Hong 
merchant Pungqua announced that that the “principal manager of Fock Tseuen Hong” was 
“officially excluded from the Hong” because he possessed “neither character, capital nor ability 
to conduct the business of the Hong.”167  This no doubt added to the trustworthiness of the 
Hongs, as they would exclude merchants who fell below their standards.  Further, they 
maintained a transparency in their business that clearly was looked upon favorably by the Select 
Committee. 
 Also amidst the Canton Factory records, there is some indication that the Hong merchants 
had a personal relationship with the leaders of the Select Committee and certain British 
merchants.  For instance, on May 11th, 1833, Howqua wrote to the Committee merely to inform 
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them that his fourth son, Yuen-hwa, after serving in the military at the “Lewchow affair,” was 
conferred an award referred to as the “Hwa Ling.”168  Reading the translated document, it clearly 
had the intonations of a proud father, and in an odd contrast to all the other documents, had 
nothing to do with business.  Yet, when spending one’s time interacting, perhaps Howqua merely 
wanted to share his fatherly pride with his British colleagues. 
 The relationship between the Hong merchants and the British comprised more than just 
respectful language—like the avoidance of referring to the British as ‘barbarians.’  The 
relationship was founded upon a long trade relationship that was mutually beneficial and crucial 
to the economic survival of both the Hong merchants and Company alike.  Indeed, their 
relationship yielded an immense tea trade for the Company and provided financial aid and 
business for the Hong merchants.  As their relationship had developed over decades there were 
many employed by the Company who had lived at Canton for many years and had come to 
understand the optimal methods for trading and interacting with the Chinese.  Conversely, the 
Chinese merchants who worked with foreigners for decades not only developed a productive 
working system but some personal relationships.  It comes as no surprise, then, that the Hong 
merchants would try to settle disputes with the British directly, and that the Company would be 
so compliant and collaborative with enforcing Chinese rules and regulations even when they 
didn’t necessarily have the authority to take much action.   This relationship challenged any 
notion that the precipitation of war between Britain and China was somehow inevitable.  Instead, 
it was in the aftermath of the loss of the Company’s monopoly, when Sino-British relations were 
managed by a superintendent of trade, when a lack of a symbiotic relationship and developed 
understanding would ultimately threaten the stability their trade and diplomacy. 
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Legal Infractions with the Chinese  
 The Company at Canton—having to deal with internal issues and a lack of authority over 
westerners, manage the relationship with the Hong merchants and appease the Chinese officials 
when trade rules were violated—also had to deal with a few incidents involving the Chinese in 
which the entire diplomatic relationship with the Chinese was on the line. 
 A notable, and thus more documented case occurred in late April of 1833.  As the 
merchants were slowly but surely moving back to Macao for the off-season, the Select 
Committee received a letter from the Hong merchants detailing troubling news.  In the 
easternmost factory, Creek Factory, lived a prominent merchant and smuggler named James 
Innes.  One afternoon, he was particularly vexed by the sound of wood being chopped near the 
factory by a Chinese coolie169 named Ho-a-shoo170.  Innes informed one of the Hong merchants 
of his displeasure, and so the merchants directed the coolie’s supervisor to “end the business.”171   
However, on April 26th the coolie again chopped wood at the Customs House, located 
just south of the Creek factory, along the Pearl River.  Being within earshot of Innes living 
quarters, Innes’ annoyance escalated and he again approached the Hong merchants.  He strongly 
urged them to reprehend the man and threaten that he either stop or be expelled from the 
factories.  Unfortunately for the situation, though, the irate coolie “very unexpectedly” indulged 
his temper and again deliberately chopped wood again at the same location.172 
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This time, Innes took it upon himself to resolve the situation.  He stormed into the 
customs house, desiring to speak with the Fung173, the head person—who was nowhere to be 
found because he had left on public business.  In a seemingly out-of-nowhere assault, confirmed 
by two witnesses, Ho-a-shoo attempted to strike Innes with two blows using his ominous wood-
chopper.  The Great Qing legal code punishment of “20 strokes of the light bamboo” for an 
unsuccessful assault clearly did not deter the coolie.174   
While Innes may have managed to escape the skirmish unharmed, he was no longer 
merely vexed by Ho-a-shoo: he was enraged.  He appealed to Howqua, whom Innes claimed to 
have “no high opinion of his veracity,”175 and uttered an ultimatum: either they would arrange to 
have the man “seized and punished” by seven o’clock or he would set ablaze the customs house 
with full intention to burn it to the ground.  Needless to say, Innes had captured the attention of 
the Hong merchants who immediately appealed to the Hoppo to apprehend the man.  At four 
o’clock they went to find the coolie, but Ho-a-shoo had already left for the day.  Fung suggested 
that the next morning they could apprehend him immediately—a reasonable enough solution, in 
the minds of the Chinese. 
Innes, on the other hand, would not wait and could not be appeased.  Promptly at seven 
o’clock, seeing no action against Ho-a-shoo yet taken, he climbed to the roof of the Creek 
Factory.  There he “shot fire arrows and burnt the lanterns at the Canton [Customs] House.”176 In 
Innes’ account of the situation he described his incendiary materials as “rockets and blue 
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lights.”177  Luckily, there were bystanders who, upon witnessing the arson, were able to 
extinguish the fire before the Customs house was engulfed with flames. 
The Hong merchants and the Hoppo were indignant.  The Hoppo took steps to punish not 
only Ho-a-shoo for his assault, but also Fung for allowing the wood chopping to continue.  They 
both had a cangue, or wooden block, placed around their neck in an uncomfortable and public 
form of punishment.  After demonstrating that they were willing to take action against the minor 
infractions by the Chinese involved, they appealed for Innes to be severely punished.  The 
potential ramifications of Innes’ actions were what most concerned the Chinese: “The 
consequences might have been very serious…It was ten thousand chances to one that the fire had 
not communicated and ended in a grand affair.”178  There’s no doubt that the Chinese took 
crimes of arson quite seriously, as they can cause mass damage to an entire city. The Chinese 
punishments for arson in the Great Qing Code were notably severe:  “One who intentionally sets 
fire to a government or private house…will be beheaded.”179As it were, the foreign factories had 
already all burned down in the great fire of 1822.180  A decade later, the fear of a conflagration 
was still quite real.   
The Hong merchants indicated their reaction to arson, when a year previously Chinese 
bandits attempted to set fire to a building.  They were apprehended and put to “immediate 
death.”181 The merchants strongly implicated the need to punish Innes by empowering the 
Company to do so:  
We consider that the Committee have hencefore understood what is just and right and 
have come to Canton to be the general superintendants of the commerce and the Heads of 
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your Honble nation’s gentlemen.  Therefore, we pray that you will [tend to] this business 
and settle it according to justice.182 
 
 The Hong merchants, in their letter to the Select Committee, made it very clear that the 
Chinese were taking it upon themselves to punish the coolie and his head person.  They further 
urged the punishment of Innes, stating stated that the Customs house is property that belongs to 
the Chinese and while Innes may not have been particularly keen on the sound of splitting wood, 
it may yet occur again.  Innes was demonstrably dangerous when enraged and needed to be 
punished. 
 Within a couple days the Committee responded to the merchants indicating that they 
would “lose no time” in investigating the situation further.183  They procured a letter from Innes 
in which he demonstrated an arrogance that would betray his guilt.  In his depiction of the 
events, he described essentially the same series of events.  The only difference being that he 
asserted his innocence, even while acknowledging his deplorable actions, asking the committee 
whether he “could have acted otherwise.”184  He explained that it would have been the “deepest 
satire” to ask the Company to intervene in his grievances.  The company was already suffering 
the “grossest public insult and injustice ever offered in any country” due to the subservience 
demanded by the Chinese.  He questioned what more could they have done for him in resolving 
his dilemma.   
 Further, he draws an analogy to the legal process he would have encountered in England.  
He would have “gone with witness and stated his case to the counsel” and after their 
deliberations he would have been “perfectly ready to accept any redress” that an English arbiter 
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would have deemed sufficient.185  However, he claimed that there was no such due process in 
China, and implied that the Chinese would not deliver any semblance of justice. 
 He defended the violence of his actions, dismissing the arson as justifiable.  Qualifying 
that his rash action was not due to the billeting of the wood, he simply stated that he yielded to 
the violent arson after the Chinese “refused to [provide] justice.”  He even audaciously placed 
the blame of the arson on Howqua, claiming that he “had the power of preventing the 
commission of the threat by simply doing justice” when he was asked to do so by Innes.186  
Clearly, there really is no justification for the arson, as Innes even indicated himself that the 
resort to violence would not be an action taken in England.  Perhaps it was due to his anger at the 
Chinese merchants’ condescension and arrogance that he began to dehumanize them and their 
society. 
 The Committee, in consultation, was upset by Innes’ calling into question their authority.  
They were even more angered by the fear of what sort of loss of life and property could have 
occurred due to the fire and the sort of political ramifications that would have been inflicted on 
the Company and its trade.  Most surprising to them was that Innes was not in the least 
remorseful of his actions, and without contesting major facts defended his actions.  Indeed, the 
letters from the Hong Merchants and Innes’ reply “speak fully for themselves.”  Further, they 
found it impossible “to imagine opinions more dangerous than those maintained by Mr. 
Innes.”187  Unfortunately, though, their lack of true authority over Innes subdued their actions 
and limited it to an appeal to the British authorities at Singapore.   
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 To address the situation, the Company had to first and foremost ensure a good 
relationship with the Chinese.  Thus, on May 10th, they sent a letter to the Hong merchants 
resolutely asserting that they considered Innes’ act as “most unjustifiable.”188  The same day, 
they sent a scornful letter to James Innes refuting many of his claims individually and 
pronouncing that “no justification [could] be made out for setting fire to a Custom House.”189   
Even so, a week later Innes responded, again defending his actions and criticizing the 
committee.  He asserted that the Committee did not have “the slightest power over the Chinese” 
and disagreed that the Committee was the “sole legal channel of communication between the 
Chinese government and British subjects.”190  He again took up a ‘Hammurabian’ view on the 
law, claiming that his retribution of arson paled in comparison to the attempt by the coolie to 
take his life.  Also exaggerating on the conceptions of legality and due process in Europe during 
the 19th century, he claimed that in the West “seizure to prevent escape of a criminal is 
instant.”191  What he was perhaps failing to realize was that in this case, he had engaged in an 
undeniably-criminal act. 
The Company again retorted, having few options to exercise under the circumstances.  In 
a reply they stated that even if Innes had sustained a “serious personal injury” they could still not 
condone reprisal to the scale of setting a public building on fire.192  In this case, the Company felt 
as though Innes was a loose cannon for the foreign community, especially in light of the Hong 
merchants’ attitude towards the situation: they seemed willing to not exercise their right to 
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enforce Chinese law if the Company could restrain Innes from such actions in the future.  The 
only problem being that the Company had little power to actually restrain Innes. 
Luckily for the British East India Company, the Select Committee, and foreigners in the 
settlement, the Hong merchants seemed to understand the situation.  They even sent a letter of to 
the Committee on May 20th, thanking them for the handling of the situation.193  What is crucial to 
note was that the Hong and the Hoppo allowed the Company to try and address the situation 
themselves.  Even though the Chinese punishment for this act was immediate death, their 
relationship seemed to indicate a clear departure from the days of legal cases like Terranova.  
The Chinese were also remarkably patient with the Committee as they slowly received letters 
from Innes and deliberated on the situation.  The only explanation for why this did not erupt into 
a significant international affair was because of the working relationship that was developed 
between the Company and the Hong merchants.  The Company’s continuous careful 
management of their relationship with the Chinese surely influenced why their trade was stable 
even amidst the rising pressure from the Qing to curb the opium trade. 
 
A similar conflict occurred at Canton about a year later, in late March of 1834.  An 
Englishman living in the westernmost Danish Factory approached one of Howqua’s pursers to 
have him pawn “a small watch and a pan of pearl mouthed small watches” and sell them on his 
behalf.194  The purser claimed that the verbal agreement reached never indicated that there would 
absolutely be a sale of the watch, but that the purser would attempt to sell it.  After being 
unsuccessful in selling the watches, the purser failed to notify the Englishman that the watches 
were not sold and were still in his possession. 
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At noon on April 22nd, 1834, the Englishman sent a courier to procure money from the 
purser.  Having not sold the watches, the Hong merchants dispatched the purser to get the 
watches to return to the Englishman.  Unexpectedly, the Englishman coincidentally encountered 
the purser while in transit and immediately demanded his money—he did not want the watches 
back.  Reaching a boiling point, the two began to argue in a mixture of Pidgin English and 
Chinese, with the Englishman calling him a “hac” and then clarifying his insult by uttering it 
again in Chinese.195  If the Chinese were to invoke Chinese legal code, the punishment for 
merely cursing would have been “10 strokes of the light bamboo.”196  However, the Hong 
merchants again would deal directly with the British so that Chinese law would not have to be 
enforced.  Shortly thereafter, the Englishmen and his younger brother who was with him at the 
time “joined in thrashing the purser till they blacked his left eye.”197  They continued to yell at 
the purser, threatening to injure him further if he did not provide them with the money that they 
requested.  Ultimately, the purser returned the watches but was quite insulted in the process.  The 
following day, the Hong merchants sought out the Englishman to try to provide some 
consequences for his actions.  The traditional Chinese punishment for this type of assault was 
“40 strokes of the light bamboo.”198  However, the Hong merchants would again try to settle the 
matter with the Company directly.   
The Englishman was for two days unable to be tracked down.  Thus, the Hong merchants 
appealed the Select Committee to expel the man from trade at Canton.  In a statement that clearly 
indicated the ability of the Hong merchants’ relationship with the Company to avoid larger-scale 
interventions and political ramifications, Howqua stated: 
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I felt a wish to petition all the great offices of the Province to inflict upon him the most 
vigorous expulsion, but I feared that doing so then would be an instantaneous deportation 
to official persons to inquire into the business…Therefore I merely state the facts to the 
merchants of hour Honble Nation generally that henceafter it may be publicly decided 
that unreasonable persons who indulge their tempers in this manner may not be allowed 
to remain here to trade.199 
 
 Because the event occurred in the aftermath of the loss of the Company’s monopoly, 
effective in April 1834, the company merely shrugged off the letter, refusing to “interfere on the 
occasion.”  Instead, they left it up to the arriving British authorities to deal with this incident.  
While the British may have underwent a restructuring of authority and agents of diplomacy, the 
Chinese demonstrated restraint, respect and understanding towards the British.  This consistent 
tendency to be respectful and understanding of each other would fundamentally turn topsy-turvy 
when the belligerent and disrespectful British superintendent of trade arrived in late 1834. 
  
When the typhoons and tides made it too dangerous to anchor, let alone sail in the midst 
of, there were two berths of refuge in the Gulf of Canton: the Two Moons.  They are referred to 
as the Moons because of the last syllable in each of their names: Capsingmun, which is located in 
the Northeast of Lantao Island on a clear path to Hong Kong; and Cumsingmun200, ten miles 
west of Lintin island, just ashore on the western coast of Keiou island.201  In August of 1833, the 
ship Samarang sustained heavy enough damage to not be able to stay afloat while docked at 
Cumsingmun.  Many of the ships contents and cargo washed ashore, and being a ship under the 
command of Jardine Matheson & Co. the owners instructed Captain Grant of the Hercules to 
assemble men to go ashore and procure washed up materials, fresh water and food. 
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The Chinese population of the Island, roughly 200,000 in number, had no direct leader or 
authority on the island with whom to negotiate.  Captain Grant’s men, on the other hand, 
acknowledged Jardine as their highest authority.  It was not completely surprising then, that 
blood would be spilled when tensions elevated.202  A Chinese farmer, upon seeing men from the 
Hercules attempting to tow one of his water buffalo, called for help.  The Chinese who came to 
his aid captured a lascar203 petty officer while the rest of the Englishmen fled to fetch 
reinforcements themselves.  Upon their return, violence broke out: the villagers armed with their 
bamboo and the Englishmen with their more sophisticated weaponry.  While they were able to 
rescue the captured lascar, a hapless East Indian sailor was stabbed in the abdomen as the British 
men again fled the scene.204  Unbeknownst to the British at the time, the lascar bled to death on 
the spot.  On the way back to the ships, however, Chief Mate Parry of the Hercules abducted a 
Chinese man, named Tsaeoseih, working in the fields and took him hostage.   
Frustrating for the Company, they were held accountable by the Chinese authorities for 
this incident at Cunsingmun.  On August 29th, the Junminfu205 issued an edict—directed at the 
Select Committee—opining that “the said chief…dispatch immediately a special communication 
that orders the two captains…to take the Chinese Tsaeoseih” and deliver him back to the Chinese 
authorities.206  Meanwhile, Parry was instructed by Captain Grant to gather all the men he could 
to search for and rescue the lascar who was held captive by the Chinese.  In a show of force, 
“two hundred seamen and ships’ officers” gathered to stage an assault on a small town on the 
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west side of Keiou Island.207  However, as they approached and saw that the walled city was well 
guarded, their courage faltered and they decided it prudent to call off the invasion.208  Yet, for a 
few minutes, the men fired some musket shots at the walled city.  Some Chinese were wounded 
from the shooting, but there were no recorded deaths. 
In the aftermath, the Chinese district magistrate heard of the event and he informed both 
the Junminfu and the governor-general in Canton of the affair.  As the Chinese turned to the 
Select Committee to resolve the situation, the Company put pressure on Jardine Matheson to 
clean up the mess their crew had made at Cumsingmun.  Hence Captain Grant, using the German 
missionary Charles Gutzlaff as his translator, negotiated with the Chinese and cooled the Chinese 
tempers surrounding the incident.  He let Tsaeoseih go free and accepted the promise made by 
the Chinese to seek out and punish the man who killed the lascar.209 
While the situation may have been resolved for the Chinese and Jardine’s men, the Select 
Committee left the situation feeling outraged and humiliated.  As they asserted in a letter to the 
governor-general of Canton on October 27th, they were “in no way connected with the operation” 
of the ships at Cunsingmun.210  Yet, the Company was still charged by the Chinese and the 
British to conduct the affairs of the British diplomacy and trade.  As their monopoly was 
crumbling far away in the halls of Westminster, the growing wealth and influence of private 
traders under the auspices of Jardine Matheson fundamentally threatened the ability of the 
company to maintain stability in their relationship with the Chinese.  This incident was quite 
large in its scale and potential to influence Sino-British relations.  What was telling about the 
affair at Cumsingmun was that while the Company was in a declining position of power it still 
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possessed the influence with the Chinese to be able to manage the relations with the Chinese 
such that the episode did not have political or economic ramifications on the China trade.  
However, any sudden shift in the way the British would handle the regulation of trade when the 
British superintendent of trade arrived in late 1834 would make it quite difficult to deal with the 
Chinese. 
 
Sometimes accidents, which seemed to be out of the hands of the foreigners, would again 
require the Company to take responsibility for the actions of British subjects.  In early March of 
1834, a man named Young and some other members of the British factory were taking an 
evening ride along the city wall of Canton.  They rode their horses along the westernmost wall, 
which adjoined the foreign trade settlement along the Pearl River.  Passing the Banice Wall gate, 
in the 11th district, Mr. Young’s horse suddenly became frightened by some sort of mischievous 
action perpetrated by a Chinese.  It caused the horse to rush “violently through the gates nearly 
half a mile” before he was stopped.211  The soldiers guarding the station, after seeing the horse 
charge through the gate, immediately pursued to stop the horse from causing a public disturbance 
in the city.  It was ultimately Mr. Young who successfully slowed the horse by using a “sharp 
edged weapon” to wound the horse.212  After the horse ceased its unruly behavior, he brought it 
back through the gate to join his companions. 
This seemingly innocuous occurrence caught the attention of the Chinese.  Feeling 
pressure to take preemptive action, the President of the Select Committee urged the local 
authorities “to take notice of the affair and inflict punishment on the [Chinese] offenders” to 
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prevent further such disturbances in Canton, where foreigners were not allowed to trespass.213  
Interestingly, the Chinese officials wrote back harshly criticizing the ‘barbarians’ for not having 
their own soldiers protect the wall and keep all foreigners out.  While they also mentioned that 
the Chinese who frightened the horse would be punished, they still remained upset that the 
disturbance had even occurred and indicated that the foreigners carried much of the blame. 
In fact, the governor-general of Canton requested that Mr. Young, who had breached the 
Canton wall and entered the city, be “severely punished” for his actions.214  Eleven days after 
calling for Mr. Young to be punished, the governor-general promulgated his opinions on the 
actions of said ‘barbarians.’  He believed that “the evening is not the time to ride out on horses” 
and that it is the duty of those riding at any time are to “keep a watch” to prevent any sort of 
disorder or disturbance.215  However, in accordance with Chinese procedure he proceeded to 
launch an investigation into the Banice affair. 
A little over a month later, on May 9th, the final opinion of the Chinese government at 
Canton was sent to the Select Committee.  The Magistrate named Huang Shaw Heen and a 
military officer named Hu both questioned the ten Chinese soldiers who were at the Banice gate 
at the time of the incident.  Their narrative positively denied that they had provoked the horse in 
any way.  They believed that the foreigners had been responsible for the horse barging through 
the gate and ultimately convinced the Chinese authorities that this was the case: “the men did 
nothing improper.”216 
This case depicts the Chinese tendency to blame the foreigners for any infraction of a 
Chinese rule.  Not only was the law that forbade foreigners from entering the city of Canton 
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suffocating and uncivil, in the minds of the foreigners, but when a foreigner accidentally rides 
through a city gate the mostly-innocuous incident explodes into a large ordeal.  It took months of 
questioning and edicts from the governor-general, local magistrates, the Hoppo and the Hong 
merchants before the Chinese concluded that their soldiers did not act improperly.  It was clear 
that when the Chinese authorities like the governor-general were involved, they were much more 
critical of foreigners and much more strict in their demand of punishment.  Again, though we see 
that the Company’s understanding the Chinese was of handling these sorts of situations allowed 
them to take the edicts with a grain of salt and to take the disrespectful commands from the 
Chinese officials as separate from their trade relationship with the Hong merchants.  Clearly, 
managing this relationship with the Chinese required patience and an understanding of the way 
in which the Chinese operate, otherwise it was quite simple for westerners not accustomed to the 
belabored processes and seemingly-inequitable laws to be thoroughly offended.  When Lord 
Napier, the first British superintendent of trade arrived at Canton in 1834, he took Chinese 
methods and language quite offensively and would fundamentally jeopardize the stability of the 
relationship with the Chinese that was established by the Company in their tenure at Canton. 
 63 
Chapter 3- Mismanagement in the Aftermath of the Company’s Loss of its Monopoly 
 From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, the British East India Company enjoyed 
the majority of the spoils from their lucrative trade in India and China.  Much to the chagrin of 
the Company, however, politicians in London were fearful of the sheer power wielded by the 
multi-national, mammoth company.  Hence, aggressive steps were taken by Parliament in 1813 
when they passed an act restricting the Company from trading in India.  The Company would 
then shift its focus from the South Asian trade to governing India on behalf of the British 
government.  Thereafter, the Company’s remaining monopoly on the China trade became the 
foundation of its financial health. 
 However, because of growing interest in Britain for free trade, the Company’s monopoly 
over the China trade would also come under political fire in the early 1830s.  As China yielded a 
profitable and important trade like tea, there were many other merchants and companies who 
argued that free trade should prevail.  Further, they posited that the volume and scope of the 
trade would increase with the end of the Company’s monopoly.  The free traders got their wish 
when, under the stewardship of Prime Minister Charles Grey, on August 28th, 1833 Parliament 
passed an act that officially ended the monopoly the British East India Company had over the 
China trade.217  The decision became effective on April 21st, 1834.   
 The act not only resulted in the Company losing its monopoly and position of authority in 
China, but in a policy designed to completely dilute the power of the Company was also 
compelled to pay fines to the British government and close down its trade operation in China.  
While it lingered in the East for a few years, it faded into insignificance within a matter of 
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months.  It was during the aftermath of this act of Parliament that the British approach to 
diplomacy and trade in China would fundamentally change. 
 
A New Structure for British Management of Trade and Diplomacy 
 In December of 1833, a Royal Commission came together to determine who would act as 
the new British official at Canton: the Superintendent of Trade.  For this duty they selected 
William John Lord Napier, a peerage from Scotland.  Upon his selection, they enumerated the 
guidelines for the Superintendent’s power, responsibilities and aims of duty.  Notably, the 
superintendent was instructed to:  
Watch over and protect the interests of [British] subjects resident at, or resorting to, the 
Empire of China for the purposes of trade; and to afford to them all such advice, 
information, and assistance, as it may be in your power to give, with a view to the safe 
and successful conduct of their commercial transactions; and, to the utmost of your 
ability, to protect them in the peaceable prosecution of all lawful enterprises in which 
they may be engaged in China.218 
 
 Thus, the Superintendent would replace the East India Company as the entity charged 
with regulating trade and assuring that the trade would continue to be stable and profitable to the 
British.  While the Superintendent was a representative of the Crown, the difference between his 
authority over the British and the Company’s was marginal.  Certainly, he had the added ability 
to command British naval forces at Canton, but he did not have the power to take action against 
criminals.  A difference from the Company, though, was that the Superintendent viewed himself 
as the representative of the British nation.  Thus, unlike the Company whose only goal was trade, 
the Superintendent would also be defending the honor of the British nation.   
While perhaps there were not that many substantial differences in enumerated power 
between the Superintendent and the Select Committee, the Royal Commission demonstrated that 
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it had learned from the experience of the Company at Canton.  Understanding the sensitivity the 
Chinese had to language and diplomacy, they instructed Napier to: 
Abstain from and avoid all such conduct, language, and demeanor as might needlessly 
excite jealously or distrust amongst the inhabitants of China, or the officers of the 
Chinese Government; or as might unnecessarily irritate the feelings, or revolt the 
opinions or prejudices of the Chinese people or Government; and that you do study by all 
practicable methods to maintain a good and friendly understanding, both with the 
officers, civil and military, and with the inhabitants of China, with whom you may be 
brought into intercourse or communication.219 
 
 The instructions made the objective clear: maintain a peaceful and stable trade 
relationship with the Chinese—an accomplishment that the Company had managed quite 
cautiously for decades.  Moreover, as the Chinese took the adherence to rules and laws more 
seriously than westerners, the Superintendents prudently were given the “duty of conforming to 
the laws and usages of the Chinese Empire.”220  Surely, a task easier said than done. 
 In a letter sent from Foreign Secretary Palmerston to Lord Napier on January 25, 1834, 
he indicated that Napier should look into opening a direct line of communication with the 
Chinese government officials—a feat unachieved by the Company.  He also encouraged an 
official survey of the Chinese coast to determine strategically advantageous areas for military 
ships to find refuge in the “event of hostilities in the China seas.”221  The British Foreign 
Ministry clearly believed that because they were dispatching an actual diplomat to China, he 
should be given more respect from the Chinese.  Moreover, he was provided with forces from the 
Royal Navy to assert his authority and defend the pride of Britain. 
 On February 7th, that Lord Napier’s ship departed from England.  Upon arriving at 
Canton on July 15, 1834, Lord Napier wasted no time in attempting to set up direct relations with 
the Governor of Canton.  In a short letter he composed, he simply informed the Governor of the 
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change in the British diplomatic structure and inquired whether “[his] Excellency [would] grant 
[him], with [his] colleagues, the honour of a personal interview” to better elucidate the details of 
their relationship.222  Unfortunately, though, the messenger charged with delivering the letter to 
the Chinese was denied access to transmit the message because it was a violation of the agreed 
upon method of communication through the Hong merchants.  And it was not the only infraction 
against Chinese law that Napier committed.  In fact, Napier had violated six laws set forth by the 
Chinese within two days of arriving at Canton: he had entered the foreign settlement without an 
appropriate pass, taken up residence without a permit, tried two separate times to deal directly 
with a Chinese official, translated his letters into Chinese and had more than one person attempt 
to transmit the letters to the Chinese.223  Although Napier believed that his arrival as British 
Superintendent changed the dynamic between the Hong merchants and the British, the Canton 
System endured.  The free traders still could only engage in legitimate trade through the Hong 
merchants.  The only difference was that the Hong merchants would communicate with the 
superintendent instead of the Select Committee.  Napier’s actions upon his arrival characterized 
the nascent stage of his mission as less than smooth. 
 In response to one of his letters to the Governor, the Hong merchants were instructed to 
reply to Lord Napier conveying that his letter should be marked as a “petition” by adding the 
superscript character: 稟.224  This implied that in the letter Napier would admit to being an 
inferior authority to the Chinese, something that both he and Palmerston were not willing to do.  
What further irked Lord Napier was that this communication, beyond ordering him to conduct 
his correspondence in a particular manner, was channeled through the Hoppo and Hong 
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merchants and not received directly through Chinese officials.  Seeing the ordeal as “insulting 
and ridiculous,” Lord Napier became resolute in his determination to establish direct relations 
with the Chinese government.225  Perhaps more alarming than his determination for direct 
communication was that he tended to perceive the roundabout communication style as a personal 
slight—whereas it was standard procedure for the Chinese.  Completely misunderstanding the 
Chinese perspective on the situation, Napier decried that the actions of the Governor of Canton 
were “an outrage on the British Crown.”226  
 Lord Napier continued to apply pressure on the Chinese to achieve direct 
communications, but to no avail.  In a letter to Foreign Secretary Palmerston, Napier asserted his 
plan to “publish among them, and disseminate, far and wide” propaganda that would clearly 
indicate the intentions of the British.227  What he again demonstrated with the very suggestion of 
releasing propaganda containing criticism of the policies of the Chinese government was his 
ignorance of the way the Chinese think and operate.  In their Confucian, paternalistic society, 
releasing pamphlets disapproving of the government would not only “constitute an intolerable 
outrage.”228  It would serve to further irritate the Chinese without gaining any ground in 
attempting to open up a direct line of communication.   
Napier’s constant challenging of an age-old procedure so insulted the Chinese that on 
August 16, 1834 the Canton officials placed an embargo on British trade.229  At first the 
Governor agreed to lift the embargo if Napier obeyed his edict to follow the ordained method of 
communication.  However, due to the disturbance of trade and relations that Napier was causing 
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at Canton, the governor also required that Napier return to Macao before the trade would 
recommence.  Not surprisingly, Napier again took the edict as a sign of arrogant insolence and 
for a month stubbornly refused to obey or respect the governor’s injunctions.  Even when 
Howqua and Mowqua came to the chief superintendent on August 28th to inform him that some 
Chinese officials had agreed to meet with him “provided that the Chinese seating arrangement 
was adopted,” Napier refused to meet on his terms.230  Not surprisingly, on September 2nd the 
governor officially ordered the suspension of “all intercourse with British subjects.”231 
 Tensions escalated when Napier decided that his best course of action was a display of 
armed force.  Specifically, he determined to dispatch British warships to the factories at Canton.  
In an overt violation of an agreed upon law, on September 5th two British frigates sailed into the 
Bogue towards the foreign settlement at the city.  By the 7th they were sailing into the Pearl River, 
where they provoked a small skirmish at a Chinese fort. Although shots were fired, no one was 
killed and they persisted in their journey up the river until they landed at Whampoa on the 
11th.232 By violating the law banning military ships from entering the Pearl River and by firing 
shots at the Chinese, Napier had blatantly ignored the instructions that were given to him by the 
Royal Commission when he was appointed superintendent. 
The hostilities resulted in a flurry of correspondence with the Hong merchants, who were 
attempting to quell the outbreak of further violence.  Approaching foreign policy in the best way 
they knew how, they Chinese began issuing edicts.  In examining Chinese edicts from 1834 
relating to foreigners, a large portion of them were issued in response to Napier’s cavalier 
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excursion to Canton.233  The eventual negotiations with the Hong merchants yielded little other 
than Lord Napier’s reluctant agreement to return to Macao.  Unfortunately for Napier, while at 
Canton he fell ill.  Shortly after retuning to Macao, on October 11th, he succumbed to his malady 
and died at the age of forty-eight.  His attempt to use force to open up the lines of 
communication proved to be of little diplomatic or economic worth.  
Lord Napier had also disregarded Palmerston’s instructions to utilize the advice of 
Company men who had extensive experience dealing with the Chinese.  The second 
superintendent of trade (second in command), John Davis, was actually the former President of 
the Select Committee.  From early August he had continually urged Napier to approach the 
Chinese with a quieter and less aggressive attitude.  Unfortunately, though, just as the conflict 
was turning hostile at Canton Davis was ordered back to Macao.   
Instead of seeking support and advice from other former Company men at his disposal, 
Napier had reached out to private traders like William Jardine—a staunch supporter of free trade 
and a more aggressive policy towards the Chinese—when negotiating with the Hong merchants.  
In fact, Napier disdained the Company for being far too soft in its policy of dealing with the 
Chinese.  He believed that it was as a direct result of the actions of the Company that the Chinese 
believed that England “depended upon [China] for food and raiment, and that the Emperor was 
the only Monarch of the universe.”234  Although, to be fair, the Company had enjoyed decades of 
lucrative trade with the Chinese while effectively managing problems in dealing with the 
Chinese with a higher success rate than the pugnacious Lord Napier. 
It is clear that in the aftermath of the loss of Company’s monopoly of the China trade, the 
cautious management of the trade and diplomatic relationship with the Chinese drastically 
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changed and was fundamentally mismanaged by Napier.  His naïve view that an aggressive 
attitude could corrode the stubbornness of Mandarin officials backfired and resulted in a failed 
policy.  Whether or not the Chinese method of communicating with foreigners was effective or 
appropriate, it was certainly unreasonable for Napier to expect the immediate and complete 
reversal of a century-old diplomatic policy.  To be able to change the policy at all, the officials 
would have had to memorialize all the way up to the administrative level of the emperor before 
even reaching the possibility of changing Qing policy.  Further, their instruction to mark 
Napier’s letter as a ‘petition’ may have resulted in the advancement of British diplomatic 
privileges, but Napier’s unwillingness to swallow his pride—by marking his letters as ‘petitions’ 
and having patience—provided him with no political or economic advantages.235 
His resort to strong actions and aggression were clearly premature.  While he could claim 
that the Chinese at the forts along the Pearl River fired on his ships first, it was the British who 
had violated law by allowing frigates to sail towards Canton.  There is no doubt that Lord Napier 
was rash, belligerent and naïve.  Ultimately, his mismanagement of the British trade and 
diplomacy in China would set the stage for the Chinese to become more frustrated with the 
British.  It would also serve to embolden a faction of hardliners in the Imperial Court at Beijing 
in their quest for political power. 
  
 The next two successors to Napier were far more innocuous.236  The first successor was 
John Davis, the former President of the Select Committee at Canton.  He had been in China since 
1813 where he learned Chinese and translated documents from Chinese into English.  In 1815 he 
was hired by the Company to be an interpreter for the Amherst diplomatic mission to China.  
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After working for the company for a decade, in 1825 he was named Chinese secretary and 
deputy superintendent of imports.  Two years later he was appointed to serve on the Select 
Committee and in January of 1832 ascended to the Presidency.  His extensive experience in 
China gave him a quite different approach to trade and diplomacy with the Chinese from that of 
Napier.  He had “a conservative point of view that was quite out of sympathy with the new free-
trade movement.”237  He refused to act aggressively towards the Chinese and seemed content 
with the way the Canton System was implemented.  However, his conservative nature caused 
many of the British traders at Canton to quite publicly criticize his policies and undermine his 
authority.   
By January of 1835 the pressure from the free traders had reached a boiling point.  Being 
a politically savvy man, after enduring much criticism Davis resigned as Superintendent of Trade.  
He was succeeded by his second-in-command, Sir George Robinson, who was both reasonable 
and temperate.  His term as superintendent was best summed up as “a time of peace and 
tranquility.”238  He defended his moderate view towards policy by noting that as superintendent 
of trade he was hardly better equipped to deal with the Chinese than the Supercargoes of the 
Company.  While he was able to maintain his authority for nearly two years, he was ultimately 
undermined by his third superintendent of trade, Captain Charles Elliot.  Elliot had been 
surreptitiously corresponding with Foreign Secretary Palmerston explaining that he would better 
administer a more middle-of-the-road policy toward the Chinese.  All he asked was that he be 
named Superintendent and be sent additional frigates.  Growing increasingly frustrated by 
China’s refusal to provide the British Superintendent with diplomatic privileges, Palmerston 
eventually began to change his mind concerning the need for the Superintendent to focus 
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primarily on maintaining a peaceful relationship with the Chinese.  He eagerly accepted Elliot’s 
offer to move away from placidity and appointed him on June 15th, 1836—although it was not 
official until word reached Canton on December 14th. 
Elliot began his tenure carefully, feigning subservience to the Chinese by seeking formal 
approval to live at Canton as the man in charge of the British at Canton.  Unfortunately, though, 
inaccuracy in the translation of the notice he submitted to the Chinese made them wrongly 
understand that his “ job was merely to control the merchants and sailors, and not to control 
trade.”239  This set the stage for his first major issue in dealing with the Chinese: he had trouble 
setting up communication with the Chinese such that he was treated like a diplomatic equal.  Not 
only were the Chinese still resistant to this petition by the British, but Elliot was under 
significant pressure from Palmerston to not tolerate insults and to do everything necessary to 
ensure that he received diplomatic equality.  When the diplomatic situation intensified in 1838, 
Palmerston encouraged a show of force by dispatching additional men-of-war to the region.240 
Another main issue was that he had trouble securing and expanding British trade, 
including the unofficially-supported opium trade.  The Chinese continued to insist on containing 
the trade to the Canton system, as it had operated stably for decades.  But as reports reached the 
Chinese that in the early month of 1838 “there was a vast increase in the number of English boats 
engaged in the illicit opium traffic inside and outside the Bogue,” they became increasingly 
stricter about enforcing their trade laws.241 
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It was clear that on the eve of the Opium War, Elliot had inherited both an intensifying 
tension with the Chinese and mounting pressure from London that would encourage a belligerent 
response to any drastic action taken by the Chinese to enforce their control of trade. 
 
The Opium Trade 
From the time of the end of the Company’s monopoly on April 21st until Lord Napier’s 
arrival at Canton on July 15th there was a degeneration of the regulation of the China trade.  The 
free traders at Canton refused to abide by the rules that the Company had enforced as well as the 
general rules set forth by the Hong merchants for foreigners to abide by at Canton.  On the 
contrary, the free traders basked in the freedom from the regulation of the East India Company 
and its regulators called Supercargoes who no longer existed.  For example, they established a 
post office, which was formerly not permitted.  They also formed a new chamber of commerce to 
help them with the regulation of a fair trade.242  Additionally, smuggling and evasion of authority 
and duties became rampant problems.  A traveler to Canton during this time described the 
situation: 
Before the expiration of the charter no English vessel was allowed to evade the native 
duties in this manner, as the Company had the control of all shipping under the British 
flag.  Since the opening of the free trade, however, no restriction of any kind is imposed 
upon the commerce, and the consequence is, that this system of underhand traffic is 
carried to a great extent.  It is expected that, shortly, receiving-vessels for other goods 
besides opium will be constantly stationed at Lintin, and it is even feared that the whole 
of the fair trade of China will eventually degenerate into a gigantic system of 
smuggling.243 
 
 Indeed, within a few years, the opium smuggling problem would precipitate to armed 
conflict in the first Opium War.  In a given trading season, opium would constitute about half of 
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the monetary value of the goods sold by the British.  For example, in the 1835-1836 trading 
season the total value of the British exports to China was $32,426,623.  Opium traded during that 
season was valued at $17,904,248, or fifty five percent of the British trade.244  With the sheer 
scale of the illicit opium trade, it might have appeared that the loss of the Company’s monopoly 
would likely have had an impact on the amount of opium smuggled into China.  However, when 
perusing the number of chests of opium imported to Canton, there is not a significant or 
exponential increase in the opium trade.  
Opium Imports at Canton
245
 
Trading Season Number of Chests Imported 
1829-30 14,000 
1830-31 18,760 
1831-32 13,503 
1832-33 23,570 
1833-34 19,786 
1834-35 16,516 
1835-36 26,200 
1836-37 21,508 
1837-38 20,040 
 
Further, there is no evidence that would indicate that the loss of the Company’s 
monopoly resulted in a surge of opium smuggling that would specifically anger the Chinese 
officials.  The trading season immediately following the loss of the Company’s monopoly 
actually witnessed a decrease in the trade of opium at Canton from 19,786 chests to less than 
17,000.  The surge in the amount of opium traded in the 1835-36 season, while marked, hardly 
indicates any sort of trend as it sharply fell the following year to a level lower than that of a the 
1832-33 season—a season under the Company’s monopoly.  From analyzing the changing power 
structure in the aftermath of April 1834, what becomes clear is that more significant than the 
                                                 
244 Chang 227 
245 Chang 223—“The import figures are based mainly on: (1) statistical statements submitted to the Committee of 
the House of Commons on the East India Company’s Affairs by Charles Marjoribanks in 1830…; (2) statements of 
the British trade at Canton published by order of the Superintendent,” and another analytical work. 
 75 
amount of opium traded was that there was a sharp change in the administration of the trade at 
Canton that was terribly mismanaged. 
 
From the Chinese Perspective 
It is important to understand the Chinese perspective on foreign trade and smuggling 
during the 1830s.  While 1834 represented a change in the way in which Britain administered its 
trade and diplomacy in China, the Canton system continued as it had for decades.  Made evident 
by the Napier Affair, as the channels of communication were changing for the British, the Hong 
merchants were caught between Chinese officials and British traders as Britain struggled to alter 
the time-tested and accepted procedure of the Canton system. 
Before 1834, the language of the correspondence between the Hong merchants and the 
Company indicated that the Hong believed the Company to be ‘representatives of their Honble 
Nation.’  Even after the East India Company lost its monopoly, members of the Company were 
still administering the end of its affairs at Canton and were present as the free traders emerged on 
the scene to engage in their free trade.  In fact, the former President of the Select Committee, 
John Davis, became the second in command at Canton.  Thus, in the minds of Howqua, Mowqua 
and other Hong merchants the change in British authority was nebulous, if at all apparent. 
In the aftermath of the Napier affair and increased concerns about smuggling along the 
China coast, political changes were occurring in Beijing which would prove to have a substantial 
affect on the handling of the relationship with foreigners at Canton.  Only a naïve historian 
would view the Chinese perspective as an “ideological monolith.”246  On the contrary, the 
Chinese system was set up to encourage consensus and a wide range of views.  Yet, the system 
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was dangerously open to be interfered with by politicians who were driven to influence China 
from the heights of the Imperial court.  During the 1830s, a political faction called the Spring 
Purification Movement began to take control of and set the tone for Chinese imperial politics. 
In the aftermath of the fall of the Ming dynasty, there was a stark change in composition 
of the highest echelons of power to include fewer of the literati class.  By the 1830s, though, a 
“heightened oppositional radicalism” emerged out of the literati class who sought to hedge their 
political power.247  The Spring Purification Movement, replete with these disgruntled literati, 
became “very much a creature of high-level factional politics” as they avidly engaged in 
“campaigning for Confucian philosophical rectification.” 248  One of the discontents prevalent in 
the literati population of Beijing was that the dynasty prohibited direct expression and political 
participation by non-office holding literati.249  This provided the Spring Purification Movement 
with a base of support that included the numerous scholar-elites of China who did not hold office.   
They particularly lamented the drastic divergence from Ming policy to give special 
political privileges to the literati.  These privileges, called Ch’ing-i250, were not afforded to them 
by the Qing dynasty.  The Spring Purification Movement utilized the hope of the scholar-elite to 
lobby the Qing to become more favorable to ch’ing-i.  Their desire for these privileges aside, 
these men adamantly believed that there needed to be an “inculcation of a new spirit of moral 
firmness and outspokenness in the elite.”251  Much to their satisfaction, within a matter of years 
the movement was successful in providing a place for both ch’ing-i and the Spring Purification 
Movement in China’s political system. 
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Immediately following Lord Napier’s aggressive entrance into the factories and his 
violent race up the Bogue, the Qing had suddenly realized their military impotence, even in such 
an easily defensible region on the banks of the Pearl River.252  The Imperial court also became 
worried that their military did not possess sufficient strength to enforce strict trade controls on 
the foreigners.  Accordingly, the governor general of Canton was immediately given orders to 
avoid arousing conflict with the foreigners and was told that “all talk of a punitive embargo by 
the Qing was to be stopped the moment the barbarians agreed to the restitution of the diplomatic 
status quo ante.”253  It was during the aftermath of the brush with Napier’s British military 
frigates that the Spring Purification Movement first moved to aggressively seize positions of 
political power.  In 1835, Daoguang’s Grand Councilor died.  As his most trusted and favorite 
advisor, his death resulted in Daoguang’s becoming less trusting of the remaining bureaucracy, 
leaving a perfect opportunity to begin to curry favor with the Emperor.254 
By early 1836, at the start of the internal debates regarding foreign trade and the opium 
problem, there were no factional advocates for any policy addressing the control of trade.  The 
pervading sense of military weakness was such that even the looming opium problem did not 
supply sufficient motive for the Qing to endorse an embargo or military response.  However, by 
1839 the literati had achieved a drastic policy shift towards warfare and strict upholding of 
policy with the foreigners, fortifying their influence in the Forbidden City.  It was the crucial 
internal debate over the legalization of opium that had turned the political tides in the favor of 
the Spring Purification Movement.255 
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The movement to legalize opium began with highly respected officials like Lu Kun256, 
governor of Liangguang257 province, and his mentor Juan Yuan, a septuagenarian who had been 
an official for the Jiaqing Emperor at Canton.  However, it was Xu Naiji258 who officially 
memorialized to the Emperor about the legalization of opium in 1836.  The essential argument 
for the legalization of opium was that the Chinese would have a better ability to control the trade 
and would benefit from levies and taxes.  Interestingly enough, the plan that went before the 
throne in May of 1836 found much support at the Imperial court and was referred to the 
Cantonese authorities for approval.259  This step would normally have guaranteed that the policy 
would be carried out because the governor-general of Canton was in favor of the legalization of 
the drug.  It is important to note that the Cohong—who dealt quite closely with the foreigners 
and the opium problem—strongly endorsed the legalization of the opium trade.  It would not 
only result in profit, but would remove the constant pressure on them to eliminate the opium 
trade.  Somehow, though, the entire legalization was inexplicably dropped long before the 
governor-general’s “highly enthusiastic endorsement” arrived back at Beijing on October 12th.260 
While the legalization was being deliberated at Canton, there was a last minute assault on 
the legalization by the Spring Purification Movement occurring at the Forbidden City in Beijing.  
Their manifest aim was to gain “supreme power within the emperor’s foreign-policy 
counsels.”261  They instigated an orchestrated crackdown on the Hong merchants and other 
Chinese implicated in the opium trade just as the emperor was debating the legalization of the 
trade.  The literati began to build a case that illustrated how opium was detrimental to military 
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forces who used it, horrible for local economies due to the outflow of silver from China, and was 
morally reprehensible as a habit.  The emperor’s opinion of the opium trade so quickly soured 
that before the enthusiastic response from Canton reached Beijing, the emperor sent word to the 
governor-general of Canton that instructed him to immediately begin determining how to curtail 
the opium trade at its source in Canton.262 
The political tides in Beijing were certainly turning in favor of the Spring Purification 
Movement.  It was unfortunate, though, that their efforts were clearly political in aim—as 
illustrated by their only focusing on rooting out the ‘evil’ at Canton.   A famous memorial by 
Spring Purificationist Huang Quezi263 on June 2nd, 1838 described how there was a need to target 
punishments at users of opium and try to eradicate demand for the narcotic.264  He specifically 
suggested that they utilize the talents of loyalist Lin Zexu who would be a perfect candidate to be 
a special commissioner of trade at Canton.  Oddly enough, although there was a significant 
opium problem in Suzhou265, it was not addressed at all in the plan to dispatch Lin to Canton.  
Further, in examining memorials from both Huang and Lin, there is no special mention of the 
need for commissioners for the oversight of the enforcement at all.  However, when one took this 
push for special attention to the opium problem at Canton in the larger context it becomes clear.  
The emperor’s suspicion of the bureaucracy’s ability to enforce trade controls mixed with the 
power struggle occurring in the Forbidden City indicated that “this resort to a strategy of high-
profile localized enforcement of the anti-user laws seems to be remarkably well suited to the 
immediate political and ideological concerns of the Spring Purification faction.”266  Thereafter, 
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the Qing dispatched hard-liner Lin Zexu to address the opium problem at Canton, where he 
inherited a broken and stubborn relationship with the British—under the command of their 
Superintendent Charles Elliot. 
 
The Precipitation of the First Anglo-Chinese War 
 Lin arrived at Canton in March of 1839, ready to embark on his mission to stamp out the 
opium trade once and for all.  His methods were described as having used a “combination of 
reason, moral suasion, and coercion” while indicating that he in no way wanted armed 
conflict.267  He immediately mobilized other degree-holding civil servants to join together to 
expose any scholars who were opium smokers.  He then incorporated a question into the civil 
service exams necessary to become a civil servant by asking students to both anonymously name 
distributors of opium and also provide their ideas for ending its trade.   
 Targeting those who likely dealt more closely with the opium trade, he personally 
interviewed each Hong merchant, reprimanding those who claimed that prominent opium traders 
like William Jardine were innocent.  He then ordered the foreigners—through the Cohong—to 
give up the chests of opium that were widely known to be stored at Lintin.  They were also 
instructed to state in writing how many weapons they owned.  Equally out of touch with the 
British point of view as many of the British were with his, Lin believed that a moral appeal to the 
foreigners to stop the trade—even without providing compensation or other incentive to give up 
their opium—would be sufficient.  He was greatly mistaken. 
 The incident that instigated tough action from Lin occurred when he ordered the arrest of 
a leading British opium trader named Lancelot Dent.  On March 24th the foreign community 
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refused to yield him to Chinese authorities.  Furious, Lin blockaded the foreigners at their 
factories and withdrew all 350 Chinese servants and workers at the foreign settlement.  After six, 
nerve-wracking weeks Elliot agreed to yield over 20,000 chests of opium in return for an end to 
the blockade.268   Famously, Lin had three large trenches dug and filled with water, salt and lime.  
He then had laborers destroy the 3 million pounds of opium now in his possession by tossing 
them into the trenches and dissolving the drug in the slurry.   
 This came as a shock to many of the opium traders who had specifically stockpiled more 
opium at Lintin because they heard rumors that the opium trade was on the verge of being 
legalized.  Not being the case, the eventual discontent of the foreigners stemmed from three 
unresolved issues.  Firstly, the dealers were not only oversupplied, but they had just witnessed a 
large amount of opium being destroyed.  The opium stocks were their livelihood and seeing them 
destroyed meant they had little to trade with the Chinese. Secondly, the extreme measures 
employed by Lin were not merely taken as affronts to traders of a company, but through Elliot 
the blockade placed on the foreign settlement was taken as a direct insult to the British nation.  
This meant there was more of a propensity to use extreme measures in response.  Thirdly, the 
traders had grievances with Elliot because it was he who had confiscated the opium and 
delivered it to Lin at the end of the blockade.  Consequently, Elliot began to feel mounting 
pressure from the British merchants to take action.  
Elliot explained the situation in a number of letters to Palmerston, who at first was not 
sympathetic to traders who failed to abide by Chinese law.  However, after hearing of the 
blockade he became more in favor of action.  The traders raised enough money to send William 
Jardine to London to argue in favor of retaliatory action against the Chinese.  Parliament, not in 
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any way declaring or agreeing to war, provided Elliot with a force of “16 warships carrying 540 
guns, 4 newly designed armed steamers, 28 transports, and 4,000 troops” commanded by Elliot’s 
cousin, Admiral George Elliot.269   
 In September and October, the clashes between the British and the Chinese resulted in 
armed battles off the coast of Hong Kong and Lintin.  As Chinese ships were sunk by Britain’s 
technologically-superior ships, the probability of immediate negotiation seemed to slip away.  
The British force under Admiral Elliot arrived in June 1840, after periodic skirmishes.  Leaving 
only a small number ships to blockade the Gulf of Canton, the fleet sailed north.  The fleet 
blockaded Ningpo, seized the main settlement on the island of Zhoushan and began to 
accumulate their forces at the Dagu Forts near the city of Tianjin.  By September of 1840, once 
the British controlled the traffic into the Pearl River, the Yangze River and the White River 
(dangerously close to Beijing), the Chinese began to seek negotiations.  A man entrusted by the 
emperor to carry out the negotiations, Qishan, convinced the British to carry out the remainder of 
the negotiations at Canton.  While he was praised for removing the military stress from a city so 
close to the capital, Lin Zexu would be banished for the outcome of the negotiations at the end of 
these small skirmishes that constituted the first Opium War. 
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Conclusion 
 
 When examining the origins of the Opium War, a strong case can be made about how the 
cultural differences resulted in the precipitation of conflict.  Indeed, many historians have 
adeptly made that case.  However, in examining the archives of the British East India Company 
from its last year of operation in China, a more specific conclusion can be made.  The 
mismanagement of the China trade by inexperienced British officials after the Company lost its 
monopoly in 1834 caused the tensions at Canton to rise to cataclysmic levels. 
 From the start of the Canton System in 1757, the Company carefully managed British 
trade relations with the Hong merchants.  The mutually beneficial relationship was not only 
cordial and respectful, but one which developed over many years of sustained interaction.  The 
Company understood how the Chinese dealt with foreigners and did not take it personally that 
local officials were condescending and dismissive of foreigners.  Their objective was to maintain 
good trade relations with the Hong so that they could benefit from the riches of the China trade, 
ranging from goods like tea and silk to ginger and rhubarb.  Conversely, the Hong relied on the 
Company to help them in times of financial crisis and to be the consistent patrons of their often-
risky trade.  
 The Company was frustrated that while they were considered the representatives of the 
British nation to the Chinese, they had little power over the British subjects at Canton.  They had 
no criminal or legal authority—other than issuing licenses—and had neither political nor military 
power in China.   This was epitomized in the case of the stowaway convicts from New South 
Wales, in which the British had to appeal to the Portuguese authorities at Macao to extradite the 
convicted felons to Britain.  In all cases of internal legal matters, the Company had to appeal to 
the British authorities at Fort William in Singapore to exert legal authority.  Additionally, as was 
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the case in the renewal of the Sylph’s license, the authorities at Fort William could overrule the 
word of the Company. 
The Company’s lack of enumerated authority presented difficult situations, like when 
James Innes nearly started a conflagration in the foreign settlement or when men from Jardine 
Matheson had an armed encounter with Chinese at Cunsingmun.  In those cases, the Company 
had no real authority to punish the British and instead had to quell Chinese anger and concern.  
Both situations demonstrated that the Hong merchants were truly vested in a stable relationship 
with the Company.  Instead of bringing in higher Chinese authorities to handle the matters in 
Chinese legal terms, as in the famous Terranova case, they empowered the Company to handle 
the matters themselves.  There was clearly a trust and comfort in the relationship that had 
developed between the Company and the Cohong over the course of the Canton System. 
 The symbiotic relationship between the Company and the Hong merchants was turned 
topsy-turvy when the Company lost its monopoly in 1834.  Arriving after months without any 
semblance of authority at Canton, Lord Napier proved that not only was he inexperienced in 
dealing with the Chinese, but that he also had little desire to learn and work around their cultural 
differences.  As he was the representative of the Crown, there was no longer a sense that British 
humility in dealing with the Chinese—a humility expressed through the actions of the Select 
Committee at Canton—was necessary.  Upon arriving he violated six Chinese laws and was 
relentless in his quest to achieve an immediate change in Qing policy to meet with Chinese 
officials directly.  If that was not damaging enough for the British relationship with the Chinese, 
he then dispatched military ships into the Pearl River and engaged in an armed conflict.  His 
refusal to heed the advice of men like John Davis, former President of the Select Committee, 
resulted in a cavalier handling of an important and fragile relationship with the Chinese.  The 
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Company had carefully managed their relationship with the Hong merchants and was willing to 
swallow its pride to achieve a lucrative trade.  Napier, on the other hand, set Britain on a more 
truculent path.   
 Napier’s actions, coupled with an opportunity to lunge for political power, greatly helped 
the case of the Spring Purification Movement in their quest for influence with the Emperor.  
Daoguang’s realization of China’s military fragility made him desirous of hearing solutions to 
avoid armed conflict with the British.  While he was open to the concept of legalizing opium—
often a source of tension between the British merchants and Chinese authorities in the south—the 
Spring Purification Movement colored Daoguang’s view of foreign trade and the issue of opium.  
They convinced him that because there were Chinese who were complicit with the trade, because 
of the negative impact opium usage had on military forces, and because it was morally 
reprehensible, the clear solution to dealing with foreigners was to strictly uphold Confucian 
values and eradicate the opium trade.  Interestingly, the numbers show that opium had not been 
growing significantly enough to merit special consideration in the late 1830s.  Moreover, it was 
not just at Canton that opium was a significant issue.  Thus, it became clear that the Spring 
Purification Movement used fear of military weakness in the wake of the Napier Affair to seize 
political power and urge the upholding of Confucian morals when dealing with the foreigners at 
Canton.  Combined with the growing misunderstanding of the Chinese by the British officials, 
the two countries were set on a collision course towards war.  Hence, it was not the Macartney 
Mission that had destined war, but rather the Company’s loss of its monopoly that set the 
conditions for armed confrontation.   
 From October 1834 until December of 1836, the British would have two quiet and 
peaceful Superintendents in Davis and Robinson—who did not effectively patch up the 
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relationship with the Chinese.  When Charles Elliot succeeded Robinson, he pledged that he 
would pursue a moderately more aggressive policy towards the Chinese.  Indeed, he received 
significant pressure from both the free traders and Foreign Secretary Palmerston to be more 
forceful.  Under his stewardship, the Chinese provoked his aggression by blockading the 
foreigners at Canton, destroying 3 million pounds of opium and causing British tempers to flare 
from Canton all the way to Westminster.  At that point, the outbreak of war was no longer a 
matter of ‘if’ but a matter of ‘when.’ 
 There is no doubt that the loss of the Company’s monopoly could not have directly 
caused the Opium War to occur in 1840.  What was also clear was that the collaborative 
environment witnessed at Canton in the final year of the Company’s monopoly directly 
contradicts any notion that the war was somehow destined for many decades.  The sudden loss of 
the monopoly and the resultant empowerment of inexperienced British officials to manage Sino-
British relations resulted in a series of actions that may have not led to the Opium War if it had 
been a more gradual change.  The prophetic remarks of a Company correspondent in London 
after learning of the loss of the Company’s monopoly in December of 1833, presented in the 
introduction, were eerily accurate: 
Though I think the abolition of the China monopoly was inevitable and that it never 
would have done for us to have gone on trading in competition with the public as a 
system, I fear, and believe, the sudden and entire stop put to our commercial relations 
with China, will tend materially to injure our assets, to enhance our responsibilities and to 
produce mischief which might have been avoided by a more gradual change.270  
 
The Company had developed a comfortable and stable method in their relationship with 
the Chinese over the course of nearly eight decades.  Surely the Company maintained 
disproportionate influence of and profit from the China trade up until the 1830s.  But when the 
free traders successfully convinced politicians in London to seek an absolute end to the 
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monopoly, they were only considering their own self-interest—they failed to consider the actual 
implications of such a sudden and drastic change.  Of course, the Chinese bear some blame as 
they were unable to adapt to the foreigners for the entirety of their interaction with Europeans 
during the Qing dynasty.  However, it is clear that the rise of the Spring Purification Movement 
was the fuse that paved the way for the British to spark a fully armed conflict by 1840.   
The Opium War is considered by historians of China to be the beginning of modern 
Chinese history due to the ramifications of the Treaty of Nanjing, which ended the war in 1842.  
However, the war overshadows the symbiotic relationship exhibited between the Company and 
the Cohong in the last year of the Company’s monopoly, which demonstrated that westerners 
and Chinese could not only work together for common interest, but also develop professional 
relationships filled with respect and mutual benefit.  Yet, the mismanagement of that very 
relationship by the British in the aftermath of the loss of the Company’s monopoly would 
ultimately set the stage for the Opium War: a war that continues to have implications for China 
and its international relations in the 21st Century. 
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